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CARRIE JOHNSON,

]
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vs.
JEFFREY DON JOHNSON,
Appellant and Cross-Appellee.

]
)
]
)
]

Priority 15
Case No. 981484-CA

BRIEF OF APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
Statement of Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §
78-2a-3(2)(h).
Statement of Issues Presented by Appellant
and Standard of Review for Issues Presented by Appellant
Appellee/Cross-Appellant Carrie Johnson, hereinafter called, "Wife," notes that
Appellant ("Husband") has not cited the record for preservation of his issues. Wife
generally agrees that Husband's issues are governed by an "abuse of discretion"
standard of review, with the adequacy of findings regarding attorney's fees governed
by a "correctness" standard. Conclusions of law regarding alimony awards are
reviewed for correctness, but findings of fact will not be reversed unless they are
"clearly erroneous." Willey v. Willey, 914 P.2d 1149 (Utah App. 1996)

Statement of Issues Presented By Cross-Appellant;
Preservation of Issues and Standards of Review
Wife presents the following issues for this Court's review:
1. Did the trial court err in finding Wife in contempt of court for
denying Husband's visitation where the issue of any alleged contempt was never raised
by affidavit nor identified in the pre-trial order and there was no evidence whatsoever
of contempt on Wife's part? Issue preserved at R. 378-379, R. 579, p. 21-22. Where
the issue was not raised by affidavit and prior notice, review is for correctness. State
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994).
2. Did the trial court err in failing to consider evidence which showed
that Husband's earnings vastly exceeded deposits to his VA credit union accounts
thereby err in rulings regarding child support, alimony and private schooling? Issue
preserved at evidence cited at Facts fl 11-23, infra.9 and at R. 294-299, R. 376-377.
A trial court's determination will be reversed if the ruling is so unreasonable that it
can be classified as arbitrary and capricious or a clear abuse of discretion. Kunzler v.
O'Dell, 855 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah App. 1993).
3. Did the trial court err in failing to consider the tax implications of its
alimony award, in imputing income to Wife without considering her need for
rehabilitation alimony, and in only awarding Wife "a minimum of five years" of nonterminable reimbursement alimony? Issues preserved in evidence at Facts t1 1-41,
infra., and R 580, p. 168; R 581, p.294-299; R. 376-377. These matters are
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Kunzler at 275.
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4. Did the trial court err in not ordering Husband to provide security for
payment of alimony and child support? Issue reserved at R 580, p. 181-183, 195 ; R.
301-302, 378. This matter is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
Kunzler at 275.
5. Did the trial court err in not awarding Wife all of her attorney's
fees? (R 581, p. 441; R. 319-355) This matter is reviewed for correctness as to
adequacy of findings. Endrody v. Endrody, 914 P.2d 1166, 1168-69 (Utah App.
1996). Failure to award all attorney's fees when evidence undisputed is an abuse of
discretion. Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494 (Utah App. 1991).
6. Should Wife be awarded her attorney's fees on appeal? When a
spouse prevails on the main issue on appeal in a divorce action she will normally be
awarded attorney's fees to be determined by the trial court on remand. Bell at 494.
Determinative Authorities
Title 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, as amended. See Exhibit A of Addendum.
Title 62A-11-321, Utah Code Annotated. See Exhibit A of Addendum.
Title 62A-11-303(18), Utah Code Annotated. See Exhibit A of Addendum.
Statement of the Case
A. Nature of Case. This is an appeal from the original divorce trial in
the above matter.
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. Wife accepts
Husband's statement of the proceedings.
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C. Disposition in the Trial Court. Wife accepts Husband's statement of
disposition but adds the following information. The trial court held Wife in contempt,
without prior notice and without evidence, for allegedly interfering with Husband's
visitation. (R 373, 481, 493, 579 p. 21-22) The trial court held Husband in contempt
for refusing to pay support but denied Wife's request that Husband post security for
payment of support. (R 301-302, 378, 579 p. 20-21, 580 p. 194-195)
D. Statement of Relevant Facts.
1. Wife and Husband first met in 1983 when the parties were both sophomores
at Brigham Young University. Wife was an English major and Husband was studying
Zoology. (T 72)l Wife's goal was to obtain an English degree and to teach secondary
education. (T 73; PI Exhibit 1) Husband's goal was unclear and he was on academic
probation. (T 72) The parties married on June 22, 1984. (T 71)
2. After the parties married Husband attended community college to
rehabilitate his grades and then returned to BYU. (T 73) During this time it was
decided that Husband would become a podiatrist. (T 73) Wife had only worked
occasional jobs before attending BYU. (T 78) Wife worked as a data base entry clerk
and cleaned apartments while the parties attended BYU. Husband worked off and on.
(T 75, 78, 95, 320; PI Exhibits 1, 7, 8)
3. Wife attended classes for Husband. (T 335) To overcome Husband's poor

References to trial transcripts are noted with capital "T" followed by page.
References to the record are noted with capital "R" followed by page. The two volumes
of the trial transcripts are at R 580 and R 581.
4

grades and improve Husband's chances of getting into podiatry school, Wife and
Husband also worked together as County Crisis Line volunteers. (T 77, 83-84; PI
Exhibit 1, PI Exhibit 5 p. 5) Wife had learned of the Crisis Line opportunity through
her employment as a research assistant to BYU Professor B.K. Harrison whose son
had used this route to get into medical school. (T 77, 315; PI Exhibit 1) Wife
prepared the application which resulted in Husband receiving a BYU service award on
the basis of their volunteer work. (T 84: PI Exhibit 5 p. 5)
4. While at BYU the parties lived rent-free in a home owned by Husband's
grandmother. They maintained the property and managed a rented basement
apartment, receiving the rent. (T 74) Wife received a $10,000 inheritance from her
grandfather. $1,500 was used to buy engines for Husband's vehicles shortly before
the parties married and $8,000 was used after marriage for living expenses and
tuition. (T 123, 314)
Podiatry College and Wife's Career Change
5. Both parties graduated from BYU in August, 1987. (T 75) Wife had
completed her student teaching practicum and received her 3 year Utah teaching
certificate. (T 76-77) However, Wife gave up her teaching career to move to
Northern California for Husband to attend the California College of Podiatric
Medicine. (T 76) The parties decided that Wife would instead manage Husband's
podiatry practice when he graduated. (T 79-80) To this end Wife accepted full time
employment with Dr. Wolpa at his Berkeley Foot Clinic while Husband was in
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podiatry college. Wife started at the rate of $1,500 per month and received raises
each year. (T 96-97)

Husband did little work during the first year of podiatry

college (1987-88) and did just a few "odd jobs" before he graduated in May 1991. (T
81-2, 86; PI Exhibits 3, 8) Husband earned about $1,000 in 1988 and about $2,000 in
1989. (T 191) For 1990 the parties had joint income of $24,868, with $21,337 being
earned by Wife. (PI Exhibit 9) Wife and Husband lived in a 60 unit apartment
complex where Wife did cleaning after she came home from work at the foot clinic.
(T86)
6. Shirley Woodward, office manager of the Berkeley Foot Clinic testified that
Wife was hired at the foot clinic because Wife and Husband's goals fit the clinic's
desire for an assistant who was interested in learning to manage her husband's
podiatry practice, both "front office" (administrative-office manager) and "back
office" (minor procedures and assisting with surgeries-podiatric assistant). (T 25-29,
37-40) Wife's application letter stated, "[M]y goal is to manage my husband's
podiatric practice." (PI Exhibit 2) Woodward testified of Wife's enthusiasm to learn
to manage Husband's practice and that Wife had discussed that she was forsaking her
teaching goals to become a team with her Husband. (T 31, 40) She testified that Wife
attended work in tattered clothing while putting Husband through podiatric college. (T
32) She observed Wife do research for Husband's school reports using clinic
journals. (T 33-34) She observed Wife at work fatigued and suffering from headaches
following her automobile accident. (T 33) She observed Wife and Husband jointly
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working on an article they were authoring together and she remembered Wife being
excited when Husband's first article, co-authored with Wife's employer, Dr. Wolpa,
was published. (T 34) Kay Maxwell testified that she observed Wife typing
Husband's research paper. (T 46)
Scholarly Articles and Automobile Accident
7. As a result of Wife's employment with Dr. Wolpa, Husband authored his
first two articles for scholarly publications. The first was co-authored with Dr.
Wolpa, Wife's employer. The second article, Improving Relationships: Listening
Skills for the Successful Podiatry Office, was co-authored by Wife and based upon her
experience in Dr. Wolpa's office. Both of these articles were prominently featured on
Husband's resume. (T 85, 87-88, 268-69, 398-399; PI Exhibit 5 p. 5) Husband's
resume was used to obtain his surgical residency. (T 398) Wife used her English
skills, research skills and typing skills to edit and type every article Husband
published. (T 85, 88-89) Wife also assisted Husband with his presentations. (T 9091) Husband credited Wife for assisting him, but testified that Wife's involvement
was lesser in later articles he published. (T 318-319; PI Exhibit 5 p. 3-5)
8. In 1988 Wife was in an automobile accident which resulted in months of
continual painful headaches, muscle spasms and pain. Although Wife was pregnant
with the parties' first child at the time of the accident, Wife continued to work full
time until the day Heather was born on November 2, 1988, when she took eight
weeks maternity leave before returning to work full time. (T 32-33, 101-102)
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Husband's Residency and VA Fellowship
9. Husband completed podiatry school in May, 1991, receiving both a Doctor
of Podiatric Medicine and a masters degree in podiatric medical education. (T 91,
269; PI Exhibit 5) Wife quit her job with the Berkeley Foot Center when the parties
then moved to Southern California for Husband to serve a two-year surgical residency
program. (T 91) Husband received a stipend of $1,000 per month. (PI Exhibit 17 p.6)
Otherwise, earned income was limited to some in-home day care provided by Wife
who stayed home with the new child and became pregnant with the parties' second
child. (T 101, 104-105; PI Exhibit 10) The parties survived on Wife's accrued
retirement from the Berkeley Health Clinic of $1,766 (T 99; PI Exhibit 10) and on
Wife's $13,800 net personal injury settlement from her automobile accident which
went to pay living expenses, pay credit cards, buy a freezer and put money down on a
car for the family. (T 102-103, 337-338) The parties lived in a home which belonged
to the estate of Wife's mother and Wife gave birth to their second child on April 29,
1992. The parties' combined earnings were $15,234 for 1991 with $9,353 earned by
Wife before she left the Berkeley Foot Clinic. (PI Exhibit 10) Earned income in 1992
was only $8,913. Wife did not work out of the home in deference to Husband's
wishes that she stay home with the child. (T 120-123) Wife did some occasional inhome day care. (T 216) Husband testified that he never asked Wife to work during
this time and that there had been a problem with an "accusation" relating to a
"babysitting problem" while Husband was in college, but denied that he had ever
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advised Wife not to work. (T 324, 393)
10. In mid-1993 the parties moved to Salt Lake City where Husband accepted
a fellowship with the Veterans Administration which provided an annual stipend of
$7,600. The parties' adjusted gross income in 1993 was $10,009. (T 106, 110; PI
Exhibit 11) At this time the parties rented a home in Woods Cross, Utah. Wife did
not work except to occasionally tend children in the home. (T 107)
Podiatry Practice
11. In April, 1994 Husband began his Podiatry practice while still associated
with the Veterans Administration. (T 109) Wife arranged patient visits, scheduled
surgeries and performed Husband's billings, including setting up the electronic billing
system with Medicare. (T 109-110) Reported business income was $22,013 for 1994,
with $7,200 from the VA bringing total income to about $30,000. (T 107, 110: PI
Exhibit 12) This was the final tax return which would be signed by both parties.
12. Husband's practice consisted chiefly as a mobile home health practice
conducted from the parties' Lay ton home. (T 109) Such arrangement avoided the
expense of setting up and staffing an office. (T 109) Most of Husband's income came
through house calls and nursing home visits. (T 356-7) Husband also worked part
time through the Diabetes Health Center and did surgeries at hospitals. (T 357, 361)
Husband also acted as the medical director of two rehabilitation/rest home facilities,
earning $500 per month for such services. (T 124; PI Exhibit 19) Husband had
minimal overhead requirements, and testified that the trunk of his car was his office.
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(T 359-360)
$20,000 per Month Revenues
13. Wife conducted billings and maintained Husband's business records for
1994 through the first months of 1995.

In early 1995 Husband recommended to

Wife, who was about to give birth to the parties' third daughter, that she should cease
managing his billings and turn the billings over to Frank Jensen of Medi-Serve, a
professional billing service which provided services to the Diabetes Health Center. (T
109, 130, 331-332)
14. Husband and Wife met Frank Jensen at a restaurant in North Salt Lake.
The parties discussed how billings had previously been handled. Frank Jensen was
concerned that there would be sufficient billing volume to justify his taking the
accounts for a 7 percent commission. In response Husband advised Mr. Jensen that
Husband's revenues were $20,000 per month. (T 50-51, 56-7) Medi-Serve accepted
the account and commenced its services in about March, 1995. (T 52, 66)
15. Medi-Serve performed Husband's billings only for a short time before
Husband determined to move collections to Laura Rogers (a/k/a Laura Warberg), a
patient with whom he was developing a personal relationship. (T 57-8 114-115, 288289) (See Note 4, infra.) Between the months of March and August 1995 monthly
Medi-Serve billings ranged from $25,284 (March) to $16,606 (August). (PI Exhibit
29) For the months of April 1995 to August 1995, monthly revenues collected
averaged $16,336 or an annual rate of $196,032. (PI Exhibit 29) However, by June
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1995 Husband was already shifting billings to Laura Rogers (T 55-56, 288-289) and
Husband arranged for payments to come directly to Husband instead of Jensen or
Rogers. (T 312) Accordingly, Medi-Serve's billings and collections were not
maximized. (T 55-58) Mr. Jensen testified that the standard write-off from billings to
that actually collected was ten to fifteen percent. (T 58) Jensen testified he saw no
reason for Husband's business volume to decrease.2 (T 56)
16. On October 2, 1995 Husband listed his monthly income as $20,000 in two
places on his application to lease a Ford Explorer. (T 379-380; PI Exhibit 30)
17. Husband's daily handwritten records in his purple notebook between
October 2, 1995 and March 30, 1996 confirmed that his practice was generating about
$20,000 per month.3 (PI Exhibit 22, 24) The purple notebook's entries averaged
$18,797 per month in home health services or an annual billing rate of $225,574 for
home health income.4 Although these billing volumes corresponded to billings done
2

Husband testified that his income was down in late 1995 and thereafter, and that he
suffered from chronic fatigue syndrome, bi-polar condition and other maladies. (T 353,
358-359, 377-378) However, it was during the very October 1995 time period labeled
by Husband as his Chronic Fatigue episode that Husband sauntered into the car
dealership, represented his income as $20,000 per month and leased a Ford Explorer. (T
392) Husband's fatigue corresponded to the intensifying of his relationship with Laura
Rogers. (See Note 4, infra.) Wife was unaware of this affliction. (T 205)
3

Entries months totaled as follows: October 1995: $18,979; November 1995:
$17,909; December 1995: $19,128; January 1996: $14,460; February 1996: $18,836;
March 1996: $23,475. (PI Exhibit 22, 24) The average for these months was $18,797.
Husband claims he was ill from late 1995 and January and February are slow months
each year while Medicare deductibles are met. (T 353)
4

The period of summer 1995 through summer 1996 coincided with the intensifying
of Husband's personal relationship with his patient/bookkeeper, Laura Rogers and
11

by Frank Jensen, Husband claimed that his handwritten notes were not accurate. (T
380) Wife testified that Husband had earned $4,000 in one day. (T 418-419)
Plaintiffs Exhibit 71 reflected a $2,340 billing day.
18. Other records verified the level of Husband's income. The $12,246 listed
as commission expenses on line 11 of Schedule C to Husband's 1996 tax return equates
to gross receipts of $188,400 for the year, based upon the 6.5% commission then
being paid to Laura Rogers for collections made.5 ($12,246/.065 = $188,400) (T 274,
301; PI Exhibit 16, 67, 69) Commissions reflected only income collected through
Rogers efforts, and did not account for additional income directly collected by
Husband's motivation to manipulate his income.
On July 5, 1996, Wife confronted Husband about his relationship with Laura
Rogers. Husband told Wife that he and Rogers "could not live without each other any
more." (T 115) Husband denied the conversation. (T 309) In August, 1996 Husband
took a trip to California to see his sister. On the way back Laura Rogers flew to Las
Vegas where she met Husband. The two drove back to Salt Lake City together. (T 116,
309-310) Husband hospitalized himself for alleged emotional problems in September,
1996. (T 116-117, 353-354) These distractions plus Husband's deliberate hiding of
income resulted in a subsequent reduction of documented income. Husband did not deny
an argument with Laura Rogers in June 1997 wherein Rogers complained that Husband
was not working enough. (T 291-292)
During his deposition Husband invoked the Fifth Amendment when questioned
about the nature of his relationship with Laura Rogers, although at trial he denied the
relationship was sexual. (T 289-290) Rogers took other trips with Husband, including
one to Chicago in June, 1997. (T 286-287) Husband gave gifts to Rogers and her
children. (T 300)
5

"Revenues" and "collections" are income actually received, as opposed to "billings."
Collections of $188,400 correlate to billings of $221,647, at a 15 % write-off rate. Laura
Rogers' commission rate was 6% until February, 1996 when it increased to 6.5%.
(T 274; PI Exhibit 67) Husband testified only that his tax preparer had checks and
ledgers and he did not understand his return. (T 296) Thus, not all commissions may
have been listed on the return where Husband did not want to tip off the IRS to his higher
income.
12

Husband.
19. Also, paragraph 2.a. of Husband's affidavit provided at a hearing in this
action in January, 1997, conservatively listed monthly billing service expense of about
$1,000. (PI Exhibit 34) At 6.5 percent this correlates to collections of $15,385 per
month or $184,615 per year, again without considering direct collections by Husband.
((1,000/.065)*12 = 184,615)
Practice Potential
20. Husband testified that it usually takes five to seven years for a podiatrist
practice to maximize. (T 305) Husband's practice had only been operating about 2lh
years when the parties separated in October, 1996. (T 115) Husband was not fully
devoting himself to his practice as he turned his interests to Laura Rogers and
resulting complications. (See Note 4 supra.) Husband is able to defer submitting
Medicaid accounts for up to a year, thereby artificially reducing his income. (T 255)
21. Wife testified that Husband received cash and kept sums of up to $2,000
hidden in the home. (T 143-145, 354-355) Husband's bank deposits were often net of
cash back at time of deposit. (T 137, 311; PI Exhibit 27)
Laura Rogers Disappears
22. Husband testified that knowledge of his receivables and collections was
"Laura Roger's business. Not mine." (T 305) However, Laura Rogers could not be
found by constables attempting to subpoena her to trial. (T 8-12) Husband testified
during trial on February 6, 1998, that Rogers' had been given notice with her services
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to end effective February 9, 1998. (T 287) Husband had last provided billing
information to Rogers a week prior to trial. (T 288)
Credit Union and Bank Accounts
23. Husband had acknowledged accounts at Veterans Administration Credit
Union and Zions Bank. (PI Exhibits 19, 25, 26) Asked about having other accounts,
Husband testified, "Maybe I have forgotten something but I'm not aware of
anything." (T 397) Deposit records to Husband's checking and savings accounts in
1995 totaled $149,124.18. Including Zions Bank as well as VA Credit Union
deposits, acknowledged deposits for 1996 totaled $230,561, $89,000 of which was
from inheritances received by Husband ($10,000 deposited on January 29, 1996 and
$79,000 deposited on August 26, 1996). (PI Exhibits 25, 26, 34 % 5) Husband's
deposits for 1997 came to $105,314 according to Husband's testimony. (T 329) The
trial court recognized $143,124 of deposits to the VAMCU accounts only for 1995,
ignoring $6,000 in deposits to the Zions account of Husband's monthly $500 receipts
from his duties as medical director of the two nursing homes. (Finding of Fact 9; R
369, 477; PI Exhibits 19, 25, 26) The trial court recognized $137,607 of deposits to
the VAMCU accounts in 1996 after deducting the $89,000 inheritance and ignoring
$4,500 earned from the nursing home directorships. The trial court accepted
Husband's statement of 1997 deposits of $105,314 despite being unsupported by any
bank statements (Def Exhibit 3), despite Husband's testimony that he didn't know the
exact amount of his 1997 earnings (T 329) and despite expressly finding that Husband
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had been dishonest in his representations of his income. (R 369, 477) The court then
averaged the three years to arrive at an average annual gross income of $128,681.
This figure was about one-half of the $240,000 per year Husband listed on his
October 2, 1995, financial statement and half of the $240,000 per year revenues
Husband represented to Frank Jensen in early 1995. Wife accordingly appeals this
finding.
Husband's Business Expenses
24. The trial court found that Husband's reasonable business expenses were
$40,000 per year leaving income after business expenses of $88,681. The trial court
then used this figure to calculate alimony and child support. (R 369, 371, 477-479)
25. After the parties' separation, Husband presented tax returns for 1995 and
1996 which Wife declined to sign as patently inaccurate. (T 117-119; PI Exhibits 15,
16) Wife filed her own returns for 1995 and 1996. (PI Exhibits 13, 14) Husband
filed the 1995 joint return without Wife's signature or permission. (T 197; PI Exhibit
15)
26. The trial court found that the 1995 and 1996 tax returns and other
information provided by Husband did not accurately reflect Husband's income, stating
"The Court finds that Respondent is not being forthright and honest in his
representation of what his income has been for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997."
(Finding of Fact 11; R 369, 477)
27. The Court's finding that Husband's business expenses were $40,000 per
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year ($3,333/month) was liberal to Husband, particularly in light of the Court's
crediting Husband with only half of his earned income. Husband's Schedule C to the
parties' 1994 tax return listed business expenses of $24,474 which included $5,100
paid by Husband to Wife and declared by Wife on her own Schedule C-EZ. (PL
Exhibit 12) Husband's Schedule C for 1995 showed business expenses of $33,192
including $1,767 depreciation and an erroneous $10,199 "other" rent expense which
related to deductions for Husband's mother's house rather than to Husband's practice.
(T 296-297, 326; PL Exhibit 15) Omitting the depreciation and "other" rent,
Husband's 1995 business expenses were $21,226. Husband's 1996 Schedule C
showed expenses of $46,496 after excluding the $14,889 Medicare payback discussed
infra at 1f 39 which should have appeared at returns and allowances, line 2. This
return also had $8,547 of "other" business rental which could not be explained and
$8,324 of vehicle lease expenses.6 Like the 1995 return, this return grossly
understated Husband's income.

(T 326-329; PI Exhibit 16) Considering the $24,474

expenses for 1994, $21,226 expenses for 1995 and the expenses for 1996, the trial
court was overly generous in finding Husband's reasonable business expenses to be
$40,000.
28. Husband's affidavit filed with the Court in 1997 was clearly inflated as it
claimed as necessary business expenses the sports car at $770 per month and the

6

Husband's home health practice produced little overhead as Husband did not
maintain a clinic or pay any staff. (T 109, 356-60)
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Explorer at $450 per month. It also claimed the Medicare repayment which had
already been fully paid back. (T 230-231; PI Exhibit 34) Husband's list of business
expenses submitted to the court at trial was not substantiated by any receipts or
primary documentation. (Def Exhibit 6) This list totaled $7,440 per month of
expenses and included items such as $860 per month for automobile payments for two
vehicles, $300 per month for maintenance and gasoline, and office supplies of $250
per month when Husband testified that the trunk of his car served as his office and his
check register showed that medical supplies were only $72 per month. (T 189, 360) It
also included as business expenses student loans of $1,700 per month and a storage
shed ($40) which were personal expenses. Husband's business expenses and personal
expenses totaled to $9,865 compared to claimed monthly income of $9,000. (Def
Exhibit 4) Husband's personal expenses included $450 per month for groceries for
one person, automobile insurance of $140 (although $1,160 auto expense had already
been claimed as business expense) and medical insurance premiums of $650 compared
to $330 for Husband, Wife and children on Husband's January 2, 1997 affidavit. (PI
Exhibit 34)
29. Either the $12,246 commissions claimed on line 11 of 1996 Schedule C
are correct and Laura Rogers collected $188,400 of revenues during 1996
($12.246/.065 = $188,400) or commissions was highly inflated ($97,549 [gross
receipts on line 1 of Schedule C] * .065 = $6,341 [assuming every dollar collected by
Laura Rogers]). (PI Exhibits 67, 69) This analysis of income again excludes
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additional income received by Husband which was not collected through Laura
Rogers.
Wife's Income
30. The parties' total incomes and respective contributions thereto to 1994, the
first year of Husband's practice, are summarized as follows: (Exhibit 78 reproduce)
(PI Exhibit 78) Whereas Wife had provided over 90 percent of the parties' income
while Husband was in college, Wife's earnings were $134 for 1995 and $376 for
1996. (PI Exhibit 13, 14) To 1993, Wife had never enjoyed a combined income of
over $24,000 and had subsisted on much less for most years. In 1994 Husband's
income reached $29,000, including $5,000 paid to Wife, as he commenced his
practice. In 1995 Husband's income increased to $20,000 per month with Wife seeing
very little of it.
31. At the time of the breakup of the marriage Wife had become the full time
mother of three children. Wife had put aside her teaching career in 1987 while
Husband earned his degrees and started his practice. Wife's Utah teaching certificate
expired while she was in California. (T 151) The parties' plans for Wife to manage
Husband's podiatry practice also had come to an end, with Wife caring for three small
children. After the parties separated, Wife attempted to perform medical transcription
at home for two months in 1997 but her computer did not match the clinic's computer.
Doctor's office positions would have required her to work until 7:00 p.m. and thus
were rejected due to the children's needs. (T 146-148) Wife also worked as a
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substitute teacher for $50.00 per day when such work was available. (T 231-232) At
time of trial Wife had been working towards re-certifying as an English teacher, but
lacking such certification, had not been able to take a teaching position. (T 150-152,
234-235; PI Exhibit 39) Further, there was a glut of English teachers in the Davis
School District leaving her unlikely to secure a position. (T 153-154, 235-237) Wife
learned that there were openings to teach business, science and math, but such would
require that she attend college for two years to quality to teach. Accordingly, Wife
was considering obtaining a master's degree, since such would similarly take the twoyear time investment. {Id.) The trial court imputed income to Wife of $1,000.00 per
month. (R 370, 478)
32. Connie Romboy, a vocational counseler, testified that she met with Wife
and found her to be centered and desirous of working, but faced with a dilemma since
there were not sufficient vocational opportunities in English teaching. Romboy
recommended that, as opposed to two years college to re-certify to teach in another
area, Wife should, in the same amount of time, obtain a masters degree in social work
or educational counseling which would allow her to start her career at a higher pay
scale than starting as a teacher. (T 401-405) She testified education would cost about
$3,000 per year for tuition and books. (T 405) Romboy testified that if Wife had
begun teaching in 1987 she would have contributed $18,180 to retirement by 1997 and
that she would have progressed up the pay scale for ten years rather than starting at
the bottom. (T 408-410)
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Home
33. Though married in 1987, Wife and Husband never owned a home of their
own until summer 1994. At this time the parties purchased a modest, three bedroom
home in Layton, Utah for $95,000, putting $6,000 down from money provided by
Husband's grandfather. (T 70, 92, 254, 374; PI Exhibit 73) The home appraised at
$118,000 at time of trial in an "as is" condition. (T 15, 19; PI Exhibit 73) At the
time of trial the home had unrepaired fire damage in the kitchen. (T 15-16) To put
the home in average marketing condition numerous items needed to be addressed:
these included replacing particle board under the kitchen floor and vinyl floor
coverings, dishwasher and microwave oven purchased and installed. The carpet in the
living room, stairwell and hallway was old and needed to be replaced. Baby rooms
and master bedroom needed work with the master bedroom having "some type of a
plaster or stucco texture all over the dry wall" but not finished and with a strange
coloring underneath. (T 17 245; See pictures in PI Exhibit 73) These improvements
would cost about $7,500 and would need to be done before average condition for the
home could be reached. (T 18) Wife, destitute from Husband's failure to pay support,
had not been able to pay for such repairs at time of trial. Accordingly, the home was
worth no more that $118,000 at time of trial. The mortgage balance was $91,258. (T
160; PI Exhibit 80) Wife requested that she be awarded the home. (T 242)
34. Although Husband's income took off in 1995, Wife saw little of it.
Husband did, before the parties' separation purchase fine cars, including a turbo
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charged Volvo sports car ($770 per month), 1991 Ford Explorer ($450 per month)
and a 1995 Volvo station wagon ($570 per month) with monthly payments totaling
$1,790. (T 139 -141; PI Exhibit 34) Husband drove the Volvo sports car and
Explorer. (T 140) Wife drove the station wagon. (T 141) By time of trial Wife had
traded in the Volvo Wagon with the $570 payment for a mini-van with a $248
payment. (T 141) After separation, in May 1997, Husband traded in the 1991
Explorer for a 1996 Jeep. (T 140) Husband testified that he required two vehicles for
his business; one as a spare car. (T 390) Wife questioned Husband's need for a spare
car when he was not paying support as ordered. (T 390)
35. Wife had not had funds to take any vacations with the children although
Husband had taken the children on trips and had also taken Laura Rogers on trips. (T
161, 285-287)
Church Assistance
36. Much of the parties' furniture had been inherited from Husband's
grandmother and was taken by Husband when he left the home. (T 175-178; PI
Exhibits 49, 50, 51) Wife had no funds to purchase new items. Friends and family
gave Wife table and chairs. (T 177) Wife and children received assistance from the
LDS Church to meet living expenses due to Husband's refusal to pay support as
ordered. (T 182-183) Wife borrowed $13,100 from her mother to pay for part of her
attorney's fees and $575 for other needs.7 (T 190, 260; PI Exhibit 75)
7

$ 10,600 had been loaned to Wife by her mother for fees by November 17,1997, as
reflected by the first page of Exhibit 75 ($10,000 by checks to attorneys and $600 cash).
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Daycare Private School
37. Wife placed the children in a day care setting which also provided private
school to the daughters old enough to attend school because the cost was comparable
to combining public school and day care costs. Wife also did this because she had
anticipated getting a teaching job with a traditional school schedule and desired that
the children have the same schedule, whereas the local public schools used the track
system. (T 162-167, 236) She found that the parties' 9 year old daughter thrived at
the school and her grades improved. (T 165-166; PI Exhibit 60) She desired this
arrangement continue. The trial court ruled that private school could be provided only
if Wife paid for it. (Finding of Fact 6; R 367-368, 476, 489)
Wife's Expenses
38. Wife provided the trial court with two sets of her monthly expenses: One
based upon her current monthly expenses of $4,504.50 (T 160; PI Exhibit 41) The
second set proposed how she would utilize an adequate award of reimbursement
alimony and child support based upon the level of Husband's income she had not been
able to enjoy but which had accrued to Husband through her efforts and sacrifices.
Expenses under the second set came to $9,275.09 and included private school for the
children, additional clothing for Wife and children, education expenses for Wife to
attend college, residence maintenance, travel, additional alimony-related income tax

The additional $2,500 was loaned by Wife's mother by paying Wife's attorneys $2,000
on December 8, 1997, and $500 on February 2, 1998. {See last two pages of Exhibit 75)
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expense and other items. (T 160-161, 167-168, 238-239; PI Exhibit 42) The trial
court, imputed Husband's annual gross income at only $128,681 instead of the
$240,000 evidenced by Husband's business records, car application and statement to
Frank Jensen. Ignoring these additional earnings available for equalizing, and Wife's
unrecompensed sacrifices, the trial court based Wife's reasonable expenses at only
$4,000 per month. (Findings of Fact 10, 11; R 370, 478, 490) The trial court also
imputed income to Wife of $1,000 leaving a deficit of $3,000 which was covered by
an award of child support of $1,482 per month and alimony of $1,518. {Id.)
Re-billed Medicare Re-payment
39. A side issue concerned about $14,889 in Medicare payments received by
Husband in 1995 which had to be repaid to Medicare during 1996.8 Husband asserted
that repayment resulted from fraudulent billing practices by Wife and Frank Jensen of
Medi-Serve. (T 301-303, 327, 32-333, 378-380; Def Exhibit 12) Wife and Jensen
both testified that they simply billed as told by Husband and that it was Husband's
failure to document procedures which resulted in re-payment when a Medicare audit
noted lack of charting. (T 59-60, 142-143) If Husband had properly documented his
services no re-payment would have been required and Husband's 1996 income would
not have been lowered by the re-payment. (T 54-55) Jensen, in response to
Husband's accusation of billing fraud, testified that Medi-Serve, for ten years, had

8

Husband's 1996 tax return listed the payback amount at $14,889 on line 27 of
Schedule C. (PI Exhibit 16) This should have been listed under returns and allowances,
line 2 instead of appearing as a business expense.
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been on Medicare's "blue ribbon" list of approved medical billing companies and was
on "good terms with Medicare." (T. 60)

Husband testified at trial that he and Laura

Rogers had since documented his procedures and re-billed for these services. (T 396)
Husband could not say whether re-payment of the re-billed re-payment had occurred
as Laura Rogers had such information and was not available to testify. {Id.)
Wife's Ring and Credit
40. After separation Husband had billed items to Wife's credit card including a
new diamond for Wife's wedding ring which Husband gave to Wife in hopes of
reconciliation while not telling Wife of the source of credit for the ring. These acts
plus Husband's refusal to pay support and bills, resulted in Wife's credit being
seriously damaged. The trial court enjoined the parties from harming each other's
credit in the future. (T 168-171, 235, 242, 281; PI Exhibit 43, 46, Finding of Fact 16;
R 372, 480, 492, 579 p. 19-20, 23-34)
Husband's Contempt
41. Husband was found in contempt of court for failing to pay $13,350 of
temporary support during the pendency of the action, which amount corresponded to
the alimony portion of the temporary support order. (T 180-181; Finding of Fact 18;
R 372-373, 381, 492; PI Exhibit 53) This finding followed the filing of an affidavit
by Wife alleging such contempt on the part of Husband and after the matter had been
certified for trial at the pre-trial. While not receiving her support Wife received the
final $3,500 of her personal injury settlement, which she spent on necessities. (T 158-
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159) Wife's request that Husband be ordered to provide security for payment of his
support obligations was denied. (T 194-195; R 301-302, 378, 579 p. 20-21)
Wife's "Contempt"
42. Although no affidavit had ever been filed by Husband and no claim was
ever made that Wife was in contempt, Wife was held in contempt by the Court for
failing to allow Husband visitation. Wife appeals this ruling as violating her rights of
due process and as being wholly unsupported by evidence. (T. 351) (Finding of Fact
19; R 373, 481, 493, 579 p. 21-22)
Attorney's Fees
43. Wife's attorney's fees came to $33,998.90 as a result of Husband's
continuing refusal to follow court orders, provide true evidence of his earnings and
Wife's need to prove the earnings. Wife used $5,000 paid from Husband's VA credit
union account at the time of separation to pay attorney's fees, but had otherwise paid
fees with funds borrowed from her mother or had not paid her fees. The trial court
found that Wife had no ability to pay her fees and that Husband did have the ability.
However, the Court ordered Husband to pay only $20,000 of Wife's fees, rather than
the total amount of $28,998.90 after crediting Husband for the $5,000 paid to Wife at
the beginning of the action. (Findings of Fact 18, 20; T 184-5, 198, 221-222, 256261; R 319-355,373, 481-482, 493; PI Exhibit 75) Wife appeals the trial court's
failure to award her all of her attorney's fees.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Wife sacrificed over thirteen years and the marriage ended on the verge of
Husband's financial success as a podiatrist. The trial court did not err in setting child
support and alimony too high and in awarding Wife all equity in the marital home
(Points I, III, IV). On the other hand, the trial court erred in ignoring overwhelming
evidence that Husband's adjusted gross income was over $200,000 per year, in setting
child support, alimony too low and in not ordering Husband to pay for private
schooling for the children (Points X, XI). The trial court did not err in ordering nonterminable alimony (Point II), but did err in failing to make such alimony nonterminable for thirteen years rather than five years (Points II, XI). The trial court's
allocation of assets and debt was appropriate (Points III, VI). Where Husband refused
to pay support as ordered, the trial court appropriately declined to grant Husband the
tax exemptions (Point V). Given the disparities in incomes it was within the court's
discretion to order Husband to pay all insurance expenses for the children (Point VII).
The trial court appropriately awarded Wife attorney's fees (Point VIII), but the
court erred in not awarding Wife all of her fees (Point XIII). The trial court abused
its discretion in not ordering Husband to provide security to assure payment of support
(Point XII). Wife must be awarded her attorney's fees on appeal. (Point XIV)
ARGUMENT
OBJECTION - FAILURE TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE
Throughout his arguments Husband fails to marshal the evidence and to provide
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this Court with all of the evidence available to the trial court. In Utah Medical
Products, Inc. v. Searcy, 958 P.2d 228, 232 (Utah 1998) the Supreme Court stated:
This court has clearly stated the burden of one who challenges a trial
court's findings of fact as follows:
To successfully challenge a trial court's findings of fact on appeal,
"[a]n appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the
findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial
court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against the
clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly
erroneous.' "
... After marshaling all the evidence in support of the trial court's ruling,
an appellant must demonstrate that even in the light most favorable to the trial
court, the evidence was insufficient to support the findings. ... We apply this
deferential standard to trial courts because of their advantaged position to
evaluate the evidence and determine the facts. ... If the challenger fails to meet
this burden, its claim must fail. ... (citations omitted.)
I.

The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion Insofar as Its Rulings Set a
Minimum Income Level of Support to Be Paid by Husband.9
A. Mrs. Johnson's Lack of Income
Wife and Connie Romboy both testified that due to a glut of certified English

teachers there had been, and likely would be, no job openings for English teachers in
the Davis School District. Therefore, it was anticipated that Wife would need to
return to school for two years to either certify in another area of teaching or to obtain
a masters degree. (Facts f 31, 32) Husband's failure to advise the Court of these
facts fails to provide the basis for the trial court's decision to impute income to Wife

9

Wife's cross-appeal at Points X and XI, infra, challenges the trial court's failure to
recognize Husband's full income and its imputation of income to Wife.
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at only $1,000 per month.
A teacher could earn the amounts testified to by Ms. Romboy only if she were
certified in a subject where she could find employment. Absent such nexus there was
no basis for the trial court to impute income higher than minimum wage to Wife.
Wife's certificate to teach English lapsed while she put Husband through podiatry
college with the mutual goal that she would manage his practice. (Facts ff 1-9, 31)
At Husband's urging Wife eventually gave up the goal of managing Husband's
practice to raise the parties' children. (Facts f 13) There was no evidence offered to
show that Wife could find a position in a podiatrist office in Utah with pay
comparable to that in the San Francisco Bay area. At the time of trial, it had been
nearly seven years since Wife worked in the podiatry office in California. Rather than
showing that Wife was employable as a teacher, Ms. Romboy's testimony showed the
opportunity cost of Wife's decision to forego her teaching career to put Husband
through college and raise the parties' children. (Facts f 32)
B. Dr. Johnson's Income
Husband omits to advise the Court that the trial court did deduct Husband's
$89,000 inheritances from deposits to Husband's credit union accounts for 1996 to
arrive at the net amount of $137,697.10 The court's ruling expressly so stated. (R
368-369, 477)
Husband omits to advise the Court that the approximate $14,889 Medicare re10

The trial court ignored the additional $4,500 deposited to the Zions account in 1996
as well as the $6,000 deposited to the Zions account in 1995. (PI Exhibits 25, 26)
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payment was shown to be the result of Husband's failure to document procedures, not
that these payments were not earned. (Facts ^ 39) Indeed Husband testified that his
office had since documented and re-billed these items. (Id.) Therefore, the trial court
was within its discretion to ignore this re-billed re-payment.
The trial court erred in Husband's favor in using the average of 1995, 1996 and
1997 deposits where Husband clearly was hiding income and his 1997 deposits were
not supported by bank documents, but only Husband's word, which the court found
unbelievable. (Facts f 26) The trial court had overwhelming reason to disbelieve
Husband's tax returns and other documentation submitted.
Husband's reasonable expenses were liberally set at $3,333 per month by the
court where Husband provided little documentation to support his claimed expenses
and where Husband's Schedule C's to the 1994 and 1995 tax returns included
appropriate business deductions of less than $2,000 per month. (Facts f 27) A
complete discussion of Husband's expenses are set forth at Facts f f 24-29. Husband's
student loans are a personal expense. They were incurred three to six years before
Husband commenced his podiatry practice. The student loans were not in jeopardy.
(T 395)
C. Combined Income
The court's combined income actually failed to recognize all of Husband's
income and imputed income to Wife in excess of minimum wage. Husband's support
obligation was set far to low as shown by Wife's cross-appeal at Points X and XI.
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II.

Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court's Award of Non-Terminable
Alimony to Wife
Wife again objects to Husband's failure to marshal the evidence. Wife's

entitlement to alimony was not limited to her expenditures during over 13 years of
sacrifices which ended on the verge of Husband's success and such entitlement should
not terminate before Wife has been reimbursed for her sacrifices.
Wife sacrificed her desire to become an English teacher in order to provide
support to her Husband and family with a view of jointly operating a successful
podiatry practice. Wife was left with neither a teaching career nor podiatry practice.
Her sacrifice enveloped over thirteen years of living in near-poverty conditions. At
time of trial she was 35 years old with full responsibility for three children ages 9, 5
and 2-1/2.
The evidence showed that Wife supported Husband through school and lived
with little until Husband started his practice in 1994. (Facts f f 4-12) The evidence
further shows that Wife received little of the benefit of Husband greatly increasing
incomes in 1995 and 1996 because of Husband's control of funds and Husband's
diversions with his patient/bookkeeper Laura Rogers. (Facts f f 33-36) From late
1996 when this action was filed to early 1998 when trial was held, Husband refused to
pay the alimony portion of support resulting in a judgment against Husband of
$13,350 and a finding that Husband was in contempt of court. (Facts f f 36, 41)
Wife lived over 13 years of spartan existence until her divorce. During the
years 1984 to 1991 which included Husband's college, the parties' combined annual
30

earnings ranged from $3,048 to $24,867, the greater majority of which was earned by
Wife. During Husband's residency the parties lived on Husband's $1,000 per month
stipend and Wife's personal injury settlement and retirement. When they returned to
Utah in 1993, Husband's income was only $10,009. (Facts %% 3, 5, 9, 10, 30)
After the parties moved to Utah, they rented a home in Woods Cross, Utah.
(Facts if 10) Their first and only purchased home, in which Wife and the children
now live, is extremely modest, dilapidated and has only three bedrooms for Wife and
three children. (Facts 1f 33) Only for a few months before the break-up of the
marriage did Wife ever enjoy any hint of a "high life" and that was limited to driving
a Volvo wagon which she has since had to replace with a Nissan mini-van in order to
cut costs. (Facts f34)
Although Wife did never enjoyed a lifestyle comparable to that expected from
an annual income exceeding $200,000 after business expenses,11 it is equally true that
Wife sacrificed and supported Husband, his home and the children through many lean
years in anticipation that she and the children would benefit from the sacrifice.
The Utah Supreme Court and Utah Court of Appeals have recognized that
alimony should be adjusted to compensate the sacrificing party when the marriage
ends on the brink of financial success. In Petersen v. Petersen, 737 P.2d 237 (Utah
App. 1987) the Court recognized the difference between 1) the traditional case where
the marriage holds together long enough for the sacrificing party to benefit from an

11

See Points X and XI, infra.
31

elevated standard of living and an increase in marital property as a result of the
medical degree; and 2) the case where divorce occurs shortly after the degree is
finally received but before the sacrificing spouse can enjoy any benefit through an
enhanced standard of living or an acquisition of substantial marital property based
thereon. In note 4, at page 242, the Court stated that while traditional alimony
analysis may be applied in the former case, a more creative approach must be used in
the latter:
In another kind of recurring case, typified by Graham, where
divorce occurs shortly after the degree is obtained, traditional alimony
analysis would often work hardship because, while both spouses have
modest incomes at the time of divorce, the one is on the threshold of a
significant increase in earnings. Moreover, the spouse who sacrificed so
the other could attain a degree is precluded from enjoying the anticipated
dividends the degree will ordinarily provide. Nonetheless, such a spouse
is typically not remote in time from his or her previous education and is
otherwise better able to adjust and to acquire comparable skills, given the
opportunity and the funding. In such cases, alimony analysis must
become more creative to achieve fairness, and an award of
"rehabilitative" or "reimbursement" alimony, not terminable upon
remarriage, may be appropriate. See, e.g., Haugan v. Haugan, 111
Wis.2d 200, 343 N.W.2d 796 (1984); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 91 N.J.
488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982). (Emphasis added.)
In Martinez v. Martinez, 818 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme
Court cited approvingly the increase in alimony ordered by the Court of Appeals
which considered the doctor husband's income of $100,000.00 per year, even though
the wife "had not enjoyed a higher standard of living as a result of that increased
income." The Court noted the trial court's finding that "the parties would have
enjoyed a higher family income because of Dr. Martinez's increased income, which
was due to some extent to the efforts of both spouses during the marriage."
The Utah Court of Appeals in ordering the increase in alimony (and that the
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award be permanent instead of limited to five years) found that the trial court erred in
considering only the wife's standard of living during the marriage:
An application of one of the English standards could justify the
award made in this case. Wife endured a poor standard of living during
the marriage. She had little money to spend then so she should have
little now. That result will preserve "the standard of living she enjoyed
during the marriage." But such a result is unfair. A divorce court is a
court of equity. It is not equitable to preserve the status of limited
income for one party and affluence for the other when the one
sacrificed to help the other achieve such affluence. When the totality
of the English standards are applied the award is clearly inadequate.
Martinez v. Martinez, 745 P.2d 69, 74-75 (Utah App. 1988).12
(Emphasis added.)
When it subsequently ruled in Martinez at 818 P.2d 542, the Supreme Court
directed the use of property division and alimony to reach equitable results. Justice
Stewart specifically stated:
"Usually the needs of the spouses are assessed in light of the
standard of living they had during the marriage. (Citations omitted.) In
some circumstances, it may be appropriate to try to equalize the
spouse's respective standard of living. (Citations omitted.) When a
marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major
change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective
efforts of both, that change, unless unrelated to the efforts put
forward by the spouses during the marriage, should be given some
weight in fashioning the support award. (Citation omitted.) Thus, if
one spouse's earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the
efforts of both spouses during the marriage, it may be appropriate
for the trial court to make a compensating adjustment in dividing the
12

English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 411-12 (Utah 1977), cited by the Court of
Appeals in Martinez, states that "the most important function of alimony is to provide
support for the wife as nearly as possible at the standard of living she enjoyed during
marriage, and to prevent the wife from becoming a public charge" and the trial court
should consider "the financial conditions and needs of the wife, the ability of the wife to
produce a sufficient income for herself; and the ability of the husband to provide
support." Martinez does away with any basis to read these guidelines too literally at the
expense of equity.
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marital property and awarding alimony/' (Emphasis added.)
Many of the foregoing principals have now been codified. § 30-3-5(7)(e), Utah Code
Annotated, provides:
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of
a major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective
efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital
property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating
adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony.
In Rayburn v. Rayburn, 738 P.2d 238, 241 (Utah 1987), the Utah Supreme Court
stated, "We acknowledge that there will be situations where an award of nonterminable rehabilitative or reimbursement alimony would be appropriate." Such was
precisely the case here.
Consistent with the Utah case and statutory law, the trial court herein used
alimony and property awards to meet the equitable objective of equalizing the parties'
standards of living and compensating Wife's sacrifices. Considering Wife's over 13
years sacrifice, the Court's award of 5 years of non-terminable reimbursement
alimony was minimal. While Wife intended to return to school, earn a masters degree
and then enter the work force, Wife's future earnings should not be used to offset
reimbursement alimony, as Wife has earned such alimony through over 13 years of
prior sacrifice.
Johnson v. Johnson, 855 P.2d 250 (Utah App. 1993) does not apply to these
facts. In Johnson, the wife had twenty years of marriage during which she not only
sacrificed during husband's medical schooling but also, thereafter, benefitted directly
from Husband's income for sixteen years. The trial court erred in attempting to
award wife part of husband's "professional status" which was the impermissible
equivalent of attempting to award a medical degree. Here the court made no such
ruling and instead based its equitable orders on Wife's failure to ever benefit from her
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sacrifices as authorized under authorities previously cited.13 Johnson specifically notes
that non-terminable alimony is permissible in appropriate situations. Id. at 252.
III.

Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court's Allocation of Marital
Assets and Debt
A. Marital Home
Husband has again failed to marshal the evidence. If one spouse's earning

capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the
marriage, it may be appropriate for the trial court to make a compensating adjustment
in dividing the marital property. Martinez 818 at 542; § 30-3-5(7)(e), Utah Code
Annotated, (fl 1-12)
Wife was awarded a small home (three bedroom for Wife and three daughters)
which was in poor condition, requiring about $7,500 in repairs and valued at
$118,300 absent such repairs. The equity in the home without such repairs was only
about $26,000.14 While Husband mentions that a gift from his grandfather was used
for the down payment, he fails to cite Wife's sacrifice of her $9,500 inheritance, her
$1,776 retirement and her $17,300 from personal injury settlements for living
expenses. (Facts ff 4, 9, 33, 41) The trial court appropriately awarded all equity to
Wife.

13

Such authorities were cited in Wife's trial memorandum. (R. 294-299)
14

If the home could be sold in its poor condition, after deduction of 10% listing and
selling expenses ($11,830) only about $14,512 equity would have remained to be split
between the parties. Husband, thus, argues over $7,256. ($118,300-$11,830-$91,958
mortgage = $14,512)
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B. Marital Debt
Husband has again failed to marshal evidence upon which the trial court relied
in ordering Husband to pay for the ring. After the parties separated, Husband
obtained Wife's wedding ring under the ruse of having it cleaned. Instead Husband
traded in Wife's diamond on a larger stone which cost about $3,500. With some
further "sleight of hand" Husband charged the new stone and some shoes for Husband
to Wife's credit card. Husband then presented the ring with new stone to Wife, who
declined to reconcile. The trial court found that this debt, was incurred after the
parties had separated and, therefore, should be assessed to Husband as incurred by
him after separation. (Facts 1f 40) The record fully supports the appropriateness of the
court's ruling. Husband had "unclean hands" and was in no position to make an
equitable argument that he should be allowed to return the stone from Wife's ring.
Such would have left Wife's ring with no stone.
IV. There Was Substantial Evidence that Wife Required Additional Education.
Husband wrongly states at page 26 of his brief, "There was no evidence
presented to indicate that Ms. Johnson will need an additional degree to support
herself." However, the testimonies of Wife and vocational expert Connie Romboy
made clear that it was not likely that Wife was going to find an English teaching
position and that, since Wife would require two years of college to re-certify to
another teaching area, Wife might just as well obtain a master's degree with two years
of college. Substitute teaching paid only $50 per day when it was available. The
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court relied upon this evidence in making a proper decision. (Facts 1f 31-32)
V.

It Was Not in the Best Interests of the Children that Husband Be Awarded
the Tax Exemptions
Husband omits to advise the Court of the following facts: At time of trial

Husband had consistently refused to pay the alimony portion of temporary support
ordered and judgment was granted against Husband for $13,350. (Facts f 41) Wife
testified that she should receive the exemptions in light of Husbands' conduct. (T
197)
This Court in Allred v. Allred, 835 P.2d 974, 977-8 (Utah App. 1992),
discussed the law of awarding tax dependency exemptions:
To consider whether the court properly awarded the exemption,
we rely on Motes v. Motes, 786 P.2d 232 (Utah App. 1989). ...
Motes recognizes the presumption created by federal tax law that
the custodial parent receive the exemption and outlines those
circumstances where the presumption can be rebutted ... In short, the
requirements are twofold. First, the noncustodial parent must have a
higher income and provide the majority of support for the child.
Second, the trial court must, from its findings, determine that by
transferring the dependency exemption to the noncustodial parent, it is
not only in the best interest of the parties, but, more importantly, also in
the best interest of the child, which in all but exceptional circumstances
would translate into an increased support level for the child.
Given Husband's refusal to pay support and the court's finding of contempt, it
is clear that it was not in the best interests of the children that Husband be awarded
any use of the exemptions.
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VI.

Husband Failed to Meet His Burden to Show That His Inheritance Was
Used by or for Wife or that Husband's Sacrifice of His Inheritance
Exceeded Wife's Sacrifice of Her Inheritance, Retirement and Personal
Injury Settlement
Husband omits to advise the Court of Wife's sacrifice of her inheritance

($9,500), retirement ($1,766) and personal injury settlement ($13,800) to the marriage
during the lean years and Wife's use of $3,500 of additional personal injury settlement
due to Husband's failure to pay support. (Facts %% 4, 9, 41) Wife had to borrow
$13,100 from Wife's mother for attorney's fees which were not ordered reimbursed
by the court. (See Point XIII infra.)
Husband further omits to advise that the $89,000 of inheritances were deposited
into Husband's credit union account checking and savings accounts into which a total
of $226,060.98 was deposited by Husband in 1996. $10,000 of inheritance was
deposited into Credit Union savings account on January 29, 1996. The deposit of
Husband's $79,000 inheritance to the credit union checking account occurred on
August 26, 1996 when the account's balance was $2,928.05. Such deposit included
an additional $9,625.34 of earnings making the total deposit $88,625.34. Noninheritance funds into which inheritance funds were co-mingled were about
$137,606.98 for 1996. (Facts 1 23)
Husband cannot, and did not, show that $89,000 of his inheritance was given to
Wife. Husband used proceeds from such account to pay about $25,000 of credit card
debt on September 2, 1996, about one month before the parties separated in early
October, 1996. (T 186; Def Exh 14) By agreement between the parties, $15,000 was
38

placed into three savings accounts of $5,000 for the children on about September 2,
1996 and Wife, never touching such funds even while Husband refused to pay
support, did not benefit therefrom. (T 187-188; Def Exhibit 15)
On October 1, 1992, $5,000 was paid to Wife from the credit union account
which Wife subsequently used for attorney's fees which Husband would otherwise
have been ordered to pay herein. (See points VIII and XIII, infra.) However, about
$10,000 of earned income had been deposited into the VA account between August
29, 1996, and October 1, 1996, in addition to the $9,625.34 earnings deposited on
August 26, 1996 and the $2,928.05 already in the account on that date. Therefore, it
cannot be said that Wife received Husband's inheritance when $22,500 of earned
funds were in the account. Husband subsequently paid Wife $9,000 for support while
the parties were separated in October, November and December 1996 (Def Exhibit
15), but these amounts were consumed by Wife and children for living expenses. (T
186) As about $40,000 of other earned funds were deposited into the credit union
account during this time, it cannot be said that it was Husband's inheritance which
was paid to Wife and children for support. (PI Exhibit 25, 26) The court never
ordered Husband to do anything with his inheritance and it was not shown that
inherited funds went to Wife. Therefore, the trial court had no reason to offset
Husband's duty to pay support with Husband's payment of marital debt before
separation, particularly in light of Wife's sacrifice of her inheritance, and personal
injury settlement.
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VII.

It Was Within the Trial Court's Discretion, and Supported by the
Evidence, to Order Husband to Pay All Insurance Costs.
The wording of § 78-45-7.15(3) Utah Code Annotated, cannot be used in

isolation to deny the trial court discretion to reach an equitable ruling that Husband
pay the entire costs of health and accident insurance for the children. In Ball v.
Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006, 1012-1013 (Utah App. 1996) former husband argued that
the literal wording of this section meant that former wife was not entitled to be
reimbursed for insurance paid by former wife's spouse since such person was a "stepparent" and not a parent as defined. This Court agreed that the wording of this
section was clear, but also ruled that § 30-3-5(1) Utah Code Annotated trumps § 7845.7.15(3) by granting the trial court the "broad discretion" to make "equitable orders
relating to the children, debts or obligations, and parties." Accordingly, the decree
crediting former wife for former wife's husband's insurance payments on behalf of the
children was upheld.
Similarly here, the trial court's broad discretion under § 30-3-5 allowed the
court to fashion its equitable remedy by ordering Husband to pay for all of the
insurance.
VIII. Substantial Evidence Supported the Trial Court's Award of Attorney's Fees
to Wife
The trial court duly found that Husband had the ability to pay, and Wife lacked
ability to pay, attorney's fees. Marshall v. Marshall, 915 P.2d 508, 516-7 (Utah App.
1996). The record is replete with evidence of Husband's high earnings ability and
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Wife's lack thereof. (Facts H 11-21, 30-36) Husband manipulated and hid his income
requiring Wife to go through the expense of proving such income. (Facts H 13-21)
As a result of these efforts the trial court found that Husband was "not forthright and
honest in his representations of what his income has been for the years 1995, 1996,
and 1997." (Facts 1 26) The trial court also found that Husband was in willful
contempt of court in failing to pay ordered support and in requiring Wife to make
applications for relief. (Facts 1 41)
Wife's fees came to $33,998.90. Wife and Wife's mother testified that of
Wife's attorney's fees, $5,000 were paid from the $5,000 which had been received
from the VA credit union account about the time the parties separated. Wife and
Wife's mother further testified that $13,100 of Wife's fees had been paid through
loans from Wife's mother. The $15,898.90 balance of attorney's fees were unpaid
with Wife lacking the ability to pay same or to repay her mother. The correct amount
of fees awarded should therefore have been at least $28,998.90 assuming credit for the
$5,000 used by Wife from the VA credit union account. (Facts 1 43) Wife cross
appeals for this difference in Point XIII infra.
CROSS APPEAL ARGUMENT
IX.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Finding Wife In Contempt
Without any basis in pleading or evidence, the trial court found Wife in

contempt of court for allegedly failing to allow visitation to Husband. (Facts \ 42)
Husband did testify to a time period in October and November, 1996, where he had
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not been able to see his children. (T 351) As this time period was prior to the
December 13, 1996 filing date of this action (R. 1) and the January 27, 1997 initial
hearing in which visitation was first established by order (R. 45), Petitioner did not
spend any time contesting or explaining the issue.15 (R. 579 p. 21-22) Husband
testified that "it took the first court appearance to get visitation rights" but never
testified that he had been denied visitation thereafter. (T 351) Accordingly, there is
no factual basis for a finding of contempt.
Additionally, the finding of contempt against Wife was entered without first
honoring Wife's due process/statutory right to prior specific notice of alleged
contempt by affidavit as required by § 78-32-3, Utah Code Annotated. Nor was Wife
put on notice at the pre-trial or by any motion filed that she was allegedly in contempt
of court and that a trial would consider such issue.16 Wife had no idea that a contempt
finding was being considered and, accordingly, made no effort to address such risk.
The finding of contempt represents complete surprise in violation of Wife's rights
under § 78-32-3, Utah Code Annotated, and the Due Process clauses of the United
States Constitution and the Utah Constitution. Bott v. Bott, 437 P.2d 684, 20 Utah 2d
329 (1968), State v. Halverson, 754 P.2d 1228 (Utah App. 1988). Accordingly, the

15

This October - November, 1996 time period corresponded to the separation of the
parties. Also, in mid-December, 1996 a protective order was entered against Husband
wherein supervised visitation was initially ordered. Civil No. 964702002SA.
16

The issue of Husband's contempt was raised by Wife's affidavits and was
specifically identified as an issue on the pre-trial order. No issue of any alleged contempt
by Wife was reserved for trial in the pre-trial order. (R 299-201)
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finding and judgment of contempt must be vacated.
X.

The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Failing to Consider Overwhelming
Evidence that Husband's Earnings Vastly Exceeded Deposits to His VA
Credit Union Accounts.
Wife challenges numerous rulings which stem from the trial court's failure to

recognize that Husband's adjusted gross income which exceeded $200,000 per year.
The trial court's rulings on alimony, child support and Husband's ability to contribute
to private schooling were all erroneous.
The trial court established an income for Husband by referring to Husband's
deposits to his VA Credit Union checking and savings accounts for 1995, 1996 and
1997. (Facts % 23) There are numerous problems with this approach. First, Husband
from spring 1995 through date of trial was in a relationship with his patient/book
keeper Laura Rogers and his deposited income did not match his billed and collected
income. (Facts 1f1 11-22; Note 4 supra.)
Second, the 1995 and 1996 credit union statements fail to account for known
income which was deposited into the Zions Bank Account. An extra $6,000 of
earnings was deposited in the Zions Bank account in 1995 and an extra $4,500 of
earnings was deposited in the Zions account in 1996 by the time the parties separated.
(Facts if 23) Third, the credit union account records failed to account for cash
received and never deposited and for cash-back withheld from check deposits made by
Husband. (Facts f 21) Fourth, the trial court accepted Husband's unsubstantiated
claim that his income for 1997 was $105,314, at the same time the court found that
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Husband was not being honest or forthright about his income and it was clear that
Husband was deliberately holding down his income pending trial in the post-separation
period.17 (Facts ifif 23-26)
Fifth, and most significantly, the record was replete with evidence showing that
Husband's gross revenues were in the $240,000 per year range rather than the
$128,681 amount imputed by the court. The testimony of Frank Jensen of MediServe that Husband advised Jensen in early 1995 that Husband's revenues were
$20,000 per month was uncontradicted. Mr. Jensen at that time agreed to accept
Husband's billings on a seven percent commission, based upon that volume. Mr.
Jensen's billings and collections thereafter reflected this level until Husband began to
move his accounts to Laura Rogers. (Facts if 14-15) Even with accounts being
diverted to Laura Rogers, Jensen's collections averaged $16,336 per month, an annual
rate of $196,032. (Id.) (Facts if 15)
Husband listed his monthly income at $20,000 per month on two different lines
on an application for a Volvo automobile on October 2, 1995. (Facts if 16, PI Exhibit
30) Husband admitted so listing his income, but claimed that he was confused about
his income because Frank Jensen had erroneously told him that his income was
$20,000. (T 379-380) However, by October 1995 most of Husband's accounts had

17

The parties separated in October, 1996. During 1997 and 1998 Husband refused
to pay the alimony portion of his support obligation claiming lack of income. The trial
court did not accept Husband's claims, held Husband in contempt of court and granted
Wife judgment for $13,350 in unpaid temporary support. (Facts if 41)
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been transferred to Laura Rogers with Husband having no reason at such time to have
asked Mr. Jensen about Husband's current earnings. (PI Exhibit 29)
Further, Husband's daily handwritten notebook entries between October 1995
and Spring 1996 show average billings of $18,797.00 per month ($225,564 annual
rate), during a time period when Husband's relationship with Laura Rogers was
diverting Husband's attention from his practice. Deductions for commissions paid on
Husband's Schedule C's and expense affidavits filed with the trial court also
corresponded to an annual rate of collections by Laura Rogers alone between
$184,615 and $188,400. (Facts ff 18, 19) These collections did not include other
collections made by Husband directly, the payments which went into the Zions Bank
account and accounts diverted from collection for up to one year. (Facts f 1f 12, 20,
21)
Husband testified that only Laura Rogers could explain his billings and
collections. However, Husband also testified that he was terminating Ms. Rogers
services and didn't know where she was although he had given her billings within a
week prior to trial. (Facts % 22) Ms. Rogers avoided Wife's subpoena to appear at
trial. (Id.) Husband testified that his practice was new and still in the growing phase.
(Facts t 20) Medicare billings need not be billed for up to one year, allowing
Husband to delay receiving income in 1997. (Facts f 21)
Under this tide of evidence the trial court clearly abused its discretion in setting
Husband's gross income at only $128,000 per year when Husband's gross income was
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$240,000 per year. (Facts t 23) This dramatic difference in annual income needed to
be accounted for before arriving at pre-tax income and considering living expenses.
Further, the trial court erroneously set Husband's monthly business expenses at $3,333
where Husband had little overhead and his legitimate Schedule C expenses for 1996
and 1997 were less than $2,000 per month. (Facts t l 23-28)
The matter therefore must be remanded for the trial court to consider
Husband's actual income in its awards of child support and alimony. This additional
income also requires that the trial court reconsider its ruling that Husband would not
be required to assist in private schooling for the children.
XI.

The alimony/reimbursement alimony award was insufficient.
The trial court's method of arriving at its alimony award failed to include

consideration of tax consequences of alimony payments by Husband to Wife. (R. 369370, 478-479) Where the court ignored over nearly half of Husband's income,
imputing Husband's income at only $128,000 per year, it was critical that Wife's
support not be further limited by failure to consider that alimony was deductible to
Husband and taxable to Wife. The alimony award must be increased after making
such adjustment for a 25% to 30% federal and state income tax payable by Wife and
35% to 40% deduction to Husband. (R. 376) At a post-trial hearing, the trial court
stated that it assumed it had considered tax consequences in arriving at its award, but
the court's ruling clearly failed to address such issue. (R 579, p. 14-15) If such was
considered, then the trial court abused its discretion in not awarding more to Wife in
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light of the tax consequences.
Although the evidence was that Wife could not obtain an English teaching
position and would need to attend college full time for two additional years, the trial
court imputed $1,000 per month income to Wife. (Facts f 31) In light of the low
imputed income to Husband and Wife's inability to return to teaching, the trial court
either should not have imputed income to Wife for two years, or, upon doing so,
should have recognized that Wife would need additional rehabilitation alimony for two
years while Wife attended school and awarded rehabilitation alimony for such time
period. The ruling left Wife without the means to return to college.
Besides being inadequate in amount, the trial court's award of "a minimum
period" of five years non-terminable reimbursement alimony is inadequate. Wife
sacrificed over 13 years of near-poverty existence, sacrificed her teaching career and
lost her opportunity to manage Husband's practice. (Facts ff 1-13, 30-36)
Accordingly, the matter must be remanded with the minimum period of nonterminable reimbursement alimony to be 13 years.
XII. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Not Ordering Husband to Provide
Security Under § 62A-l 1-321 Utah Code Annotated
Where Husband steadfastly refused to pay support as ordered and was found in
contempt, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Wife's request that Husband
be ordered to provide security for support payments. §§ 62A-l 1-321 and 62A11303(18)(b), Utah Code Annotated, set forth in Addendum A, provide that security may
be required where there is a combined support obligation for alimony and child
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support. Wife filed a verified motion notifying Husband that this relief would be
requested at trial. (R. 245-246) Wife and the children clearly required the assistance
of such an order to assure timely receipt of support. (Facts f 41)
The trial court declined to grant such request stating that contempt powers were
sufficient threat. However, the trial court, although finding Husband in contempt,
stayed Husband's five day jail sentence and left Husband with minimal anxiety of the
consequences of deliberate contempt. Further, the purpose of the security requirement
is to assure timely payment of support, whereas contempt sanctions often deal only
with partially remedying the past. Given Husband's course of conduct the trial court
should have imposed the bond requirement.
XIII. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Not Awarding Wife All of Her
Attorney's Fees
Although Wife's attorney's fees through trial came to $33,998.90 the trial court
awarded Wife only $20,000 in attorney's fees. Wife acknowledges that $5,000 from
the parties' bank account was used by Wife for attorney's fees. After considering
such, however, Wife should have been awarded $28,998.90.
As shown in Point VIII supra., the evidence was clear that Husband had the
means to pay for Wife's attorney's fees and that Wife did not. (Facts % 43) The trial
court made no finding that Wife's attorney's fees were excessive, and considering
Wife's burden of proving Husband's income, such fees were clearly appropriate. It is
an abuse of discretion to award less than the claimed amount of attorney's fees without
reasonable justification. The trial court must explain a sua sponte reduction to allow
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meaningful review. Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 426 (Utah App. 1990), Bell
v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 494 (Utah App. 1991) Absent explanation, the trial court
abused its discretion in failing to award the entire $28,998.90 amount of Wife's
attorney's fees.
Further, the case centered around Husband's ability to pay support. The trial
court declined Wife's post trial request that the trial court certify its award of
attorney's fees as being in the nature of support to assure they could not discharged in
a bankruptcy filing. The trial court stated that the matter could be dealt with at such
time as a bankruptcy filing might occur and declined to consider the matter. (R 579,
p. 8-9) As Wife's attorney's fees clearly were incurred to establish support for herself
and her children the court abused its discretion in failing to designate the attorney's
fees award in the nature of support.
XIV. Wife must be awarded her attorney's fees on appeal.
Husband has filed an appeal and not marshaled the evidence leaving the expense
of such burden to Wife. Wife is entitled to recover her attorney's fees on appeal.
Bell at 494.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's order finding Wife in Contempt must be reversed. Based upon
the evidence this Court should increase child support and alimony awards in
accordance with Husband's adjusted gross income of over $200,000 per year and
order Husband to pay private schooling for the children, or the case must be remanded
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for the trial court to reconsider and increase child support and alimony awards and to
re-address the private schooling issue. Reimbursement alimony must extend to
thirteen years, the length of the marriage. If Husband's higher earnings are not to be
recognized, despite the overwhelming evidence, the matter must be remanded for the
trial court to adjust alimony to account for Husband's tax deduction and Wife's
inclusion of taxable income and to reconsider either removing the income imputed to
Wife or granting Wife rehabilitation alimony.
The trial court should also be instructed to require Husband to provide security
for payment of his child support and alimony obligations and to award Wife all of her
attorney's fees, including Wife's fees incurred during this appeal. The judgment for
Wife's attorney's fees should be declared to be in the nature of support.
DATED this / ^ ^ d a y of February, 1999.

PAUL W. MORTENSEN
Attorney for Petitioner
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EXHIBIT A

UT ST § 3 0-3-5, Disposition of property--Maintenance and health care
of parties and children--Division of debts--Court to have continuing
jurisdiction--Custody and visitation--Determination of
alimony--Nonmeritorious petition for modification

court's division of debts, obligations, or
liabilities and regarding the parties' separate,
current addresses; and

Utah Code § 30-3-5

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 30. HUSBAND AND WIFE
CHAPTER 3. DIVORCE

(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these
orders; and

(Information regarding effective dates,
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in
this document.)

(d) provisions for income withholding in
accordance with Title 62 A, Chapter 11,
Recovery Services.

Current through End of 1998 General Sess.

§

30-3-5. Disposition of propertyMaintenance and health care of parties
and children—Division of debts—Court
to
have
continuing
jurisdictionCustody and visitation—Determination
of alimony—Nonmeritorious petition for
modification

(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the
court may include in it equitable orders relating
to the children, property, debts or obligations,
and parties.
The court shall include the
following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the
payment of reasonable and necessary medical
and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a
reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase
and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital,
and dental care insurance for the dependent
children;
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is
responsible for the payment of joint debts,
obligations, or liabilities of the parties
contracted or incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify
respective creditors or obligees, regarding the
Copyright (c) West Group 1998
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(2) The court may include, in an order
determining child support, an order assigning
financial responsibility for all or a portion of
child care expenses incurred on behalf of the
dependent children, necessitated by the
employment or training of the custodial parent.
If the court determines that the circumstances
are appropriate and that the dependent children
would be adequately cared for, it may include
an order allowing the noncustodial parent to
provide child care for the dependent children,
necessitated by the employment or training of
the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to
make subsequent changes or new orders for the
custody of the children and their support,
maintenance, health, and dental care, and for
distribution of the property and obligations for
debts as is reasonable and necessary.
*8559 (4)(a) In determining visitation rights of
parents, grandparents, and other members of the
immediate family, the court shall consider the
best interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the
need for peace officer enforcement, the court
may include in an order establishing a visitation
schedule a provision, among other things,
authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court
ordered visitation schedule entered under this
chapter.
(5) If a petition for modification of child

No claim to original U.S. Govt, works

UT ST § 30-3-5, Disposition of property--Maintenance and health care
of parties and children--Division of debts--Court to have continuing
jurisdiction--Custody and visitation--Determination of
alimony--Nonmeritorious petition for modification
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custody or visitation provisions of a court order
is made and denied, the court shall order the
petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees
expended by the prevailing party m that action,
if the court determines that the petition was
without merit and not asserted or defended
against in good faith.

(d) The court may, under appropriate
circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties'
respective standards of living.

(6) If a petition alleges substantial
noncompliance with a visitation order by a
parent, a grandparent, or other member of the
immediate family pursuant to Section
78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been
previously granted by the court, the court may
award to the prevailing party costs, including
actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by
the prevailing party because of the other parly's
failure to provide or exercise court-ordered
visitation.

(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves
on the threshold of a major change m the
income of one of the spouses due to the
collective efforts of both, that change shall be
considered in dividing the marital property and
in determining the amount of alimony. If one
spouse's earning capacity has been greatly
enhanced through the efforts of both spouses
during the marriage, the court may make a
compensating adjustment m dividing the marital
property and awarding alimony.

(7)(a) The court shall consider at least the
following factors in determining alimony:

*8560 (f) In determining alimony when a
marriage of short duration dissolves, and no
children have been conceived or born during the
marriage, the court may consider restoring each
party to the condition which existed at the time
of the marriage.

(I) the financial condition and needs of the
recipient spouse;
(n) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to
produce income;
(in) the ability of the payor spouse to provide
support; and

or born during the marriage, the court may
consider the standard of living that existed at the
time of the marriage.

(g)(i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to
make substantive changes and new orders
regarding alimony based on a substantial
material change in circumstances
not
foreseeable at the time of the divorce.

(IV) the length of the marriage.
(b) The court may consider the fault of the
parties m determining alimony.
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to
the standard of living, existing at the time of
separation, in determining alimony in
accordance with Subsection (a). However, the
court shall consider all relevant facts and
equitable principles and may, in its discretion,
base alimony on the standard of living that
existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short
duration, when no children have been conceived
Copyright (c) West Group 1998

(n) The court may not modify alimony or issue
a new order for alimony to address needs of the
recipient that did not exist at the time the decree
was entered, unless the court finds extenuating
circumstances that justify that action.
(in) In determining alimony, the income of any
subsequent spouse of the payor may not be
considered, except as provided m this
subsection.
(A) The court may consider the subsequent
spouse's financial ability to share living
No claim to original U.S. Govt, works
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expenses.

annulment and his rights are determined.

(B) The court may consider the income of a
subsequent spouse if the court finds that the
payor's improper conduct justifies that
consideration.

(9) Any order of the court that a party pay
alimony to a former spouse terminates upon
establishment by the party paying alimony that
the former spouse is cohabitatmg with another
person.

(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration
longer than the number of years that the
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to
termination of alimony, the court finds
extenuating circumstances that justify the
payment of alimony for a longer period of time.

Amended by Laws 1994, c 284, Laws 1995, c 330, § 1,
eff May 1, 1995, Laws 1997, c 232, § 4, eff July 1, 1997
HISTORICAL NOTES
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically
provides otherwise, any order of the court that a
party pay alimony to a former spouse
automatically terminates upon the remarriage of
that former spouse. However, if the remarriage
is annulled and found to be void ab initio,
payment of alimony shall resume if the party
paying alimony is made a party to the action of
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Section 2 of Laws 1995, c 330 provides
"It is not the intent of the Legislature that termination of
alimony based on cohabitation with another person in
accordance with Subsection 30-3-5(9), be interpreted in
any way to condone such a relationship for any purpose "

Search this disc for cases citing this section.
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UT ST § 62A-11-303,

Definitions

Utah Code § 62A-l 1-303
WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 62A. HUMAN SERVICES
CODE
CHAPTER 11. RECOVERY
SERVICES

PART 3. PUBLIC SUPPORT OF
CHILDREN
(Information regarding effective dates,
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in
this document.)

Page 1
married, or a member of the armed forces of the
United States; or
(c) a son or daughter of any age who is
incapacitated from earning a living and is
without sufficient means.
(6) "Child support" is defined in Section
62 A-l 1-401.
(7) "Child support guidelines" or "guidelines"
is defined m Section 78-45-2.
(8) "Child support order" or "support order" is
defined in Section 62A-l 1-401.

Current through End of 1998 General Sess

§ 62A-11-303. Definitions
As used m this part:
(1) "Adjudicative proceeding" means an action
or proceeding of the office conducted in
accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46b,
Administrative Procedures Act.
(2) "Administrative order" means an order that
has been issued by the office, the department, or
an administrative agency of another state or
other comparable jurisdiction with similar
authority to that of the office.
(3) "Assistance" or "public assistance" is
defined m Section 62A-l 1-103.
(4) "Business day" means a day on which state
offices are open for regular business.
(5) Child means:
(a) a son or daughter under the age of 18 years
who is not otherwise emancipated, selfsupporting, married, or a member of the armed
forces of the United States;
(b) a son or daughter over the age of 18 years,
while enrolled in high school during the normal
and expected year of graduation and not
otherwise
emancipated,
self-supporting,
Copyright (c) West Group 1998

(9) "Court order" means a judgment or order
of a court of appropriate jurisdiction of this
state, another state, the federal government, or
any other comparable jurisdiction issued under
Section 30-3-5, Section 78-3a-906, Title 78,
Chapter 45a, Uniform Act on Paternity, or other
statute relating to support.
(10) "Director" means the director of the
Office of Recovery Services.
(11) "Disposable earnings" is defined m
Section 62A-11-103.
(12) "Income"
62A-11-103.

is

defined

m

Section

(13) "IV-D" is defined m Section 62A-l 1-103.
(14) "Notice of agency action" means the
notice required to commence an adjudicative
proceeding m accordance with Section
63-46b-3.
*19245 (15) "Obligee" means an individual,
this state, another state, or corporate jurisdiction
to whom a duty of child support is owed, or who
is entitled to reimbursement of child support or
public assistance.
(16) "Obligor" means a person, firm,
corporation, or the estate of a decedent owing a
duty of support to this state, to an individual, to
No claim to original U.S. Govt, works

UT ST § 62A-11-303, Definitions

Page 2

another state, or other corporate jurisdiction in
whose behalf this state is acting.

common law marriage.

Section

(22) "Support" includes past-due, present, and
future obligations established by:

(18) Parent means a natural parent, an adoptive
parent, or stepparent of a dependent child.

(a) a court or administrative order or imposed
by law for the financial support, maintenance,
health, or dental care of a dependent child; and

(17) "Office"
62A-11-103.

is

defined

in

(19) "Person" includes an individual, firm,
corporation, association, political subdivision,
department, or office.
(20) "Presiding officer" means a presiding
officer described in Section 63-46b-2.
(21) "Stepparent" means a person ceremonially
married to a child's natural or adoptive custodial
parent who is not the child's natural or adoptive
parent or one living with the natural or adoptive
custodial parent as a common law spouse,
whose common law marriage was entered into
in a state which recognizes the validity of
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(b) a court or administrative order for the
financial support of a spouse or former spouse
with whom the obligor's dependent child resides
if the obligor also owes a child support
obligation that is being enforced by the state.
(23) "Support debt," "past-due support," or
"arrears" means the debt created by nonpayment
of support.
Amended by Laws 1992, c 160, Laws 1995, c 258, § 7,
eff May 1, 1995, Laws 1996, c 1, § 16, eff Jan 31, 1996,
Laws 1997, c 232, § 32, eff July 1, 1997
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UT ST § 62A-11-321, Posting bond or security for payment of support
debt--Procedure

Utah Code § 62A-11-321
WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 62A. HUMAN SERVICES
CODE
CHAPTER 11. RECOVERY
SERVICES

PART 3. PUBLIC SUPPORT OF
CHILDREN
(Information regarding effective dates,
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in
this document.)
Current through End of 1998 General Sess

§ 62A-11-321. Posting bond or security
for
payment
of
support
debtProcedure
(1) The office shall, or an obligee may,
petition the court for an order requiring an
obligor to post a bond or provide other security
for the payment of a support debt, if the office
or an obligee determines that action is
appropriate, and if the payments are more than

Copyright (c) West Group 1998
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90 days delinquent. The office shall establish
rules for determining when it shall seek an order
for bond or other security.
(2) When the office or an obligee petitions the
court under this section, it shall give written
notice to the obligor, stating:
(a) the amount of support debt;
(b) that it has petitioned the court for an order
requiring the obligor to post security; and
(c) that the obligor has the right to appear
before the court and contest the office's or
obligee's petition.
(3) After notice to the obligor and an
opportunity for a hearing, the court shall order a
bond posted or other security to be deposited
upon the office's or obligee's showing of a
support debt and of a reasonable basis for the
security.
As enacted by Chapter 1, Laws of Utah 1988

Search this disc for cases citing this section.
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63-46a-12.1;

Utah Code § 78-2a-3

(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;

WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PARTI. COURTS
CHAPTER 2A. COURT OF
APPEALS

(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of
record m criminal cases, except those involving
a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record m criminal
cases, except those involving a conviction of a
first degree or capital felony;

(Information regarding effective dates,
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in
this document.)
Current through End of 1998 General Sess

§ 78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to
issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all
writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders,
and decrees; or
(b) m aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate
jurisdiction,
including
jurisdiction
of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state
agencies or appeals from the district court
review of informal adjudicative proceedings of
the agencies, except the Public Service
Commission, State Tax Commission, School
and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees,
Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands
actions reviewed by the executive director of the
Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;

(f) appeals from orders on petitions for
extraordinary writs sought by persons who are
incarcerated or serving any other criminal
sentence, except petitions constituting a
challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a
first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for
extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of
the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases
involving a first degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from district court involving
domestic relations cases, including, but not
limited to, divorce, annulment, property
division, child custody, support, visitation,
adoption, and paternity;
*25945 (I) appeals from the Utah Military
Court; and
(]) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals
from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion
only and by the vote of four judges of the court
may certify to the Supreme Court for original
appellate review and determination any matter
over which the Court of Appeals has original
appellate jurisdiction.

(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(I) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of
political subdivisions of the state or other local
agencies; and
(n) a challenge to agency action under Section
Copyright

(c) West Group 1998

(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with
the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b,
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of
agency adjudicative proceedings.
Amended by Laws 1994, c 13, Laws 1995, c 299, § 47,
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eff May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 159, § 19, eff July 1,
1996; Laws 1996, c. 198, § 49, eff July 1, 1996.
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Utah Code § 78-32-3
WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART IV. PARTICULAR
PROCEEDINGS
CHAPTER 32. CONTEMPT
(Information regarding effective dates,
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in
this document.)
Current through End of 1998 General Sess.

§ 78-32-3. In immediate presence of court;
summary action—Without immediate
presence; procedure

Copyright (c) West Group 1998

When a contempt is committed in the
immediate view and presence of the court, or
judge at chambers, it may be punished
summarily, for which an order must be made,
reciting the facts as occurring in such immediate
view and presence, adjudging that the person
proceeded against is thereby guilty of a
contempt, and that he be punished as prescribed
in section 78-32-10 hereof. When the contempt
is not committed in the immediate view and
presence of the court or judge at chambers, an
affidavit shall be presented to the court or judge
of the facts constituting the contempt, or a
statement of the facts by the referees or
arbitrators or other judicial officers.
Search this disc for cases citing this section.
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UT ST § 78-45-7.15, Medical expenses

Utah Code § 78-45-7.15
WEST'S UTAH CODE
TITLE 78. JUDICIAL CODE
PART IV. PARTICULAR
PROCEEDINGS
CHAPTER 45. UNIFORM CIVIL
LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT
(Information regarding effective dates,
repeals, etc. is provided subsequently in
this document.)
Current through End of 1998 General Sess

§ 78-45-7.15. Medical expenses
(1) The court shall order that insurance for the
medical expenses of the minor children be
provided by a parent if it is available at a
reasonable cost.
(2) In determining which parent shall be
ordered to maintain insurance for medical
expenses, the court or administrative agency
may consider the:
(a) reasonableness of the cost;
(b) availability of a group insurance policy;
(c) coverage of the policy; and
(d) preference of the custodial parent.
(3) The order shall require each parent to share
equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium
actually paid by a parent for the children's
portion of insurance.
(4) The children's portion of the premium is a
per capita share of the premium actually paid.
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The premium expense for the children shall be
calculated by dividing the premium amount by
the number of persons covered under the policy
and multiplying the result by the number of
children m the instant case.
(5) The order shall require each parent to share
equally all reasonable and necessary uninsured
medical expenses, including deductibles and
copayments, incurred for the dependent
children.
(6) The parent ordered to maintain insurance
shall provide verification of coverage to the
other parent, or to the Office of Recovery
Services under Title IV of the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., upon initial
enrollment of the dependent children, and
thereafter on or before January 2 of each
calendar year. The parent shall notify the other
parent, or the Office of Recovery Services under
Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
Section 601 et seq., of any change of insurance
carrier, premium, or benefits withm 30 calendar
days of the date he first knew or should have
known of the change.
(7) A parent who incurs medical expenses
shall provide written verification of the cost and
payment of medical expenses to the other parent
withm 30 days of payment.
*27045 (8) In addition to any other sanctions
provided by the court, a parent incurring
medical expenses may be denied the right to
receive credit for the expenses or to recover the
other parent's share of the expenses if that
parent fails to comply with Subsections (6) and
(7).
Added by Laws 1994, c 118 Amended by Laws 1995, c
258, § 14, eff May 1, 1995
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Art. I, § 6

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law
§ 472 et seq.; 39 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 5.
A.L.R. — Anticipatory relief in federal
courts against state criminal prosecutions
growing out of civil rights activities, 8
A.L.R.3d 301.
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law G=>
83(1), 121 to 123.

Utah Law Review. — The Mootness Question in Habeas Corpus Proceedings Where Petitioner Is Released Prior to Final Adjudication, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 265.
Habeas Corpus and the In-Service Conscientious Objector, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 328.
Post-Conviction Procedure Act: Limitation
on Habeas Corpus?, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 595.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Habeas Corpus §§ 5 to 7.

Sec, 6. [Right to bear arms.]
The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and
defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful
purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of arms.
History: Const. 1896; L. 1984 (2nd S.S.),
S.J.R. 3.
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1983, Senate

Joint Resolution No. 2, proposing to amend
this section, was repealed by Senate Joint Resolution No. 3, Laws 1984 (2nd S.S.), § 2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Prospective application.
Regulation of right to bear arms.
Prospective application.
The amendment to this provision by Laws
1984 (2nd S.S.), Senate Joint Resolution No. 3
is to be given prospective application only.
State v. Wacek, 703 P.2d 296 (Utah 1985).

Regulation of right to bear arms.
This section gives sufficient authority for the
legislature to forbid the possession of dangerous weapons by those who are not citizens, or
who have been convicted of crimes, or who are
addicted to drugs, or who are mentally incompetent. State v. Beorchia, 530 P.2d 813 (Utah
1974).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — The Individual Right
to Bear Arms: An Illusory Public Pacifier?,
1986 Utah L. Rev. 751.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Weapons
and Firearms § 4.
C.J.S. — 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law
§ 511; 94 C.J.S. Weapons § 2.

A.L.R. — Gun control laws, validity and
construction of, 28 A.L.R.3d 845.
Validity of statute proscribing possession or
carrying of knife, 47 A.L.R.4th 651.
Key Numbers. — Constitutional Law ®=> 82;
Weapons ®=> 1, 3, 6 et seq.

Sec, 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.
History: Const. 1896.
Cross-References. — Eminent domain generally, § 78-34-1 et seq.
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AMENDMENT XIV

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

CARRIE L. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,

RULING

vs.

Case No. 964701989

JEFFREY DON JOHNSON,
Defendant,

JUDGE MICHAEL G. ALLPHIN

This matter came before the court for trial on February 6, 1998 and was taken
under advisement to allow the Defendant to provide Form 1099s for the calendar year 1997.
The Court had these documents faxed to it on March 3, 1998. The Court having considered
the testimony of the parties and the evidence presented at the time of trial and on March 3,
1998, now enters the following findings and order:
1. Both parties were residents of Davis County at least three months prior to the
filing of the complaint and service of process was accomplished pursuant to the law. This
court finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter in this case.
2. The parties were married on June 22, 1984 and have remained husband and
wife to the present. The parties have experienced irreconcilable differences and the Court will
award a decree of divorce to become final upon entry.
3. The following are minor children born of this marriage: Heather Erinne, born
Nov. 2, 1988; Ansley Brooke, born April 29, 1992; and Kevyn Kathleen born July 12, 1995.
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The parties have stipulated that the Petitioner should exercise the primary physical care of the
minor children and the Court will enter an order to that effect. The Respondent petitions the
Court for joint legal custody of the minor children. The Court finds that it is not in the best
interest of these children to have joint legal custody in the parties. The parties have not
demonstrated the ability to get along one with another and to agree upon what is in the best
interest of the minor children. However, the Respondent is entitled to all of the statutory
benefits of being a noncustodial parent and the Court will direct counsel for the Petitioner to
incorporate into the decree of divorce all of those statutory benefits and rights.
4. The Respondent is entitled to reasonable rights of visitation with the minor
children and the Court will order that at a minimum he should receive the standard rights of
visitation as set forth in the statute. Even though the minor child Kevyn is not quite three
years old, the Court will order that the Respondent have the same visitation rights with her as
he does the older children and that is the standard visitation for children over five. All of the
statutory rights and responsibilities pertaining to visitation shall be set forth in the decree.
5. The parties are ordered to be responsible for one-half of the actually incurred
day care expenses when the custodial parent is working. Those expenses must be reasonable
as compared to day care services generally. The noncustodial parent is entitled pursuant to the
statute to provide day care if he is available on a regular basis to do so.

If the Petitioner

pursues her education to get a teaching certificate, the Respondent is ordered to reimburse one
half of the day care which is incurred as a result of her taking college courses.
6. The Petitioner has chosen to enroll the children in a private school. The Court
finds that there will not be excess resources on either side and that private school is a luxury
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and not specifically required in this case, therefore, the Court will not order the noncustodial
parent to be responsible for one half of any private school tuition or books. If the Petitioner
determines to enroll the children in private school, she will do it with the knowledge that she
would be paying all of the costs.
7. The Respondent is ordered to provide health and accident insurance for the
benefit of the minor children. The Court having considered the financial circumstances and
abilities of the parties relating to the payment of the insurance premium will order that the
Respondent be responsible for the payment of that premium and he will not be entitled to any
offset against child support for that premium. However, the parties will each be responsible
for one half of the non-covered medical expenses of the minor children. Counsel for
Petitioner is directed to put in the decree the statutory language regarding the reimbursement
of medical expenses.
8. The Respondent is directed to maintain a life insurance policy of a minimum of
$100, 000.00, with the minor children named as beneficiaries. In the event of the
Respondent's death the insurance proceeds would be used for the support of the minor
children.
9. The Court has the obligation to determine the Respondent's income in this case.
Evidence was presented to show that during 1995 the Respondent deposited in his VAMCU
account $143,124.18. However, Respondent reported on his 1995 Schedule C that his gross
receipts were $80,677. For the calendar year 1996 the Respondent deposited in his VAMCU
account $137,606.98. (This figure was derived by taking the total number of deposits and
subtracting $89,000 inheritance he received that year). During the trial the Respondent
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provided the Court with Exhibit 3 which contains a summary of his 1996 deposits which
showed deposits of $124,415.69. In addition to that, the Court received as evidence
Respondent's 1996 income tax return and on his Schedule C for that year he reports gross
receipts of $97,549. For calendar year 1997 the Respondent reports in his Exhibit 3 that his
total earning deposits for 1997 was $105,314.21. However, he has provided the Court with
the 1099 statements for that year and he shows a total income of $94,471.35. The Court notes
there are discrepancies in the years 1995, 1996, and 1997 as to what Respondent says his
income is and the tax returns which he filed and the bank deposits for 1995 and 1996. The
Court finds that the Respondent is not being forthright and honest in his representation of what
his income has been for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997. The Court is going to calculate the
Respondent's income by the following method. The Court will take the average of the 1995
deposit of $143,124 and the 1996 deposits of $137,606 and the Respondent's representation of
his 1997 deposits of $105, 314. The average of those three years the Court calculates being
$128,681. Now, the Respondent is entitled to reasonable expenses to operate his business.
The Court having examined the expenses of the Respondent as he has related them on his tax
return and having considered his testimony finds that he does not accurately represent his
expenses in the tax returns. The Court will find that reasonable expenses for the Respondent
are $40,000 per year. Taking the imputed gross receipts of $128, 681 less the $40,000
expenses, the Court finds that the Respondent's income for purposes of calculating child
support and alimony is $88,681 or $7390 per month.
10. The Petitioner is entitled to receive and the Respondent is ordered to pay child
support pursuant to the guidelines using an income for Respondent of $7390 and imputing to
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the Petitioner $1000 per month. The Court imputes income to the Petitioner because she has a
Bachelor's Degree in English, and the Court finds she has the ability to work and to earn
income of at least $1000 per month. Using the guidelines, the Court finds that child support
would be $1482 per month. The Respondent is ordered to pay that amount beginning with the
month of February 1998. Counsel for Petitioner is directed to prepare a child support
worksheet using the figures of $7390 for the Respondent and $1000 for the Petitioner and the
resulting number if it should be different from the calculation of the Court would be the
amount ordered for child support.
11. The Petitioner has reasonable minimum expenses in the amount of $4000 per
month. The Court finds she has the ability to make $1000 per month which would calculate to
approximately $750 in net income that she can generate on her own. That leaves expenses to
be covered of $3250. She has a child support award of $1482 per month which would leave
the amount of $1768 in expenses that would not be covered by her income or child support.
The Petitioner has a need for alimony. The Respondent has a gross monthly income for
purposes of calculating alimony of $7390 per month. After taxes, the Court finds that he has a
net income of approximately $5500 and reasonable expenses of $2500 per month. This leaves
the Respondent with the ability to pay approximately $3000 per month toward child support
and alimony. He is ordered to pay $1482 per month in child support, which leaves $1518
which he has the ability to pay to Petitioner in the form of alimony. Based on the need of the
Petitioner and the ability of the Respondent to pay, the Court will order that Respondent pay to
Petitioner $1518 per month in alimony for a minimum of five years and a maximum of 13
years. The Court finds that the Petitioner has made significant sacrifice during the term of the
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marriage as the Respondent has pursued his graduate degree and subsequent training. The
Respondent's degree and his ability to now support himself as a doctor was due to some extent
to the efforts of both parties during the marriage. The Respondent will benefit hereafter until
he retires and the Court finds that it is appropriate that the Petitioner benefit from her efforts
and sacrifices for a minimum period of five years. The Court will term this minimum period
of alimony as reimbursement alimony. Alimony shall terminate after five years upon the
remarriage or cohabitation of the Petitioner.
12. In addition, the Court finds that it is appropriate in this case to likewise make
a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital property. The parties have acquired a home
in Layton, Utah that has an appraised value of $118,300 and a mortgage balance of $91,258.
The equity of the parties in that real property is $27,042. The Court finds it equitable to
award Petitioner the marital home, and the entire equity in the home. The Court
acknowledges that $6000 came from Respondent's grandfather and was used as the down
payment for the purchase of the marital residence. However, the Court considers this $6000
to have been a gift to both parties. The Petitioner will be responsible for paying the mortgage
payment and hold the Respondent harmless in the event of her nonpayment.
13. The parties have acquired certain personal property during the term of the
marriage. The Court will award the property that is currently in the possession of each party
to that party except as hereafter noted. The Court finds that the Petitioner has certain items of
personal property that are the Respondent's and she should transfer that property to the
Respondent as soon as possible. Those items are the trophy baseball, a box of antique
hammers and tools, a shovel with an "N" on it, and a tricycle and wagon. In addition, the
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Petitioner is to give Respondent access to family photos that may be copied. The Court notes
that Respondent may have real property that was gifted to him and will order that the
Petitioner have no interest in any real property that he may own separately. The Court awards
to the Petitioner her automobile and to the Respondent his two automobiles.
14. The parties have acquired certain debts and obligations during the term of
their marriage. The Court will order that each party pay the debts and obligations incurred by
them since the time of separation. In addition, the Court will order that the Respondent be
responsible for his student loans and any tax debt that has been incurred.
15. Each party will be responsible for the filing of their own separate tax returns
for the years 1996 and 1997. The Court will award tax exemptions for the youngest child and
the oldest child to the Petitioner and will award the exemption for the middle child to the
Respondent.
16. The Court will issue a permanent mutual injunction against either party
interfering with the credit or accounts of the other party.
17. The Court will issue a permanent mutual injunction against either party
harming, harassing, going to the home or work place of the other except for purposes of
exercising visitation.
18. The Court finds that the Respondent is delinquent in his alimony and child
support obligation through the month of January 1997 in the amount of $13,350. The Court
will enter a judgment against the Respondent on behalf of the Petitioner in that amount. The
Respondent in his testimony indicated that he did not have the ability to pay each and every
month and that is why the arrearage. The Court finds that during the period that the
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Respondent was ordered to pay that he purchased two automobiles of which he only needed
one and that he took vacations and trips which were not necessary. The Court will find that he
had the ability to pay the amount that he was ordered on an ongoing basis and that he willfully
violated the order of the Court and the Court will find him in contempt. The Court will order
that he spend five days in the Davis County Jail but will suspend the jail time on condition that
he strictly follow the orders of the Court in the future. In addition, the Court will award some
attorney's fees that will be calculated later.
19. The Petitioner had an ongoing responsibility to provide the Respondent with
visitation with the minor children. The Court finds that the Petitioner wilfully violated the
order of the Court in this respect and that she denied visitation and the Court will find her in
contempt of Court and order that she spend five days in the Davis County Jail. The Court will
suspend the jail time on condition that she strictly follow the orders of the Court in the future.
20. The parties each have had to incur substantial attorneys' fees in this matter to
get the case to trial. The Court will find that the Respondent has the ability to pay his own
attorney's fees. The Court will find that the Petitioner, with her limited income and resources,
does not have the ability to pay her attorney's fees. The Court will find that reasonable
attorney's fees to be incurred on behalf of the Petitioner in this particular case is $20,000.
The Court finds that while Petitioner does not have the ability to pay these fees that the
Respondent does have the ability to generate income to pay these fees and will enter a
judgment against him on behalf of the Petitioner in the amount of $20,000 for attorney's fees.
21. It is the understanding of the Court that neither party has any retirement
benefits and thus there would be nothing to share pursuant to Woodward.
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22. Each of the parties is ordered to cooperate in the execution of any documents
necessary to finalize this order, or for property distribution, custody, visitation, and child
support under the terms of this divorce decree.
23. Counsel for Petitioner is directed to prepare an order consistent with this
ruling.
Dated this 26th day of March 1998
BY THE COURT

JUDGE MICHAEL G. ALI0>HIN

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that the attached RULING was mailed by First Class postage to the
individuals listed below on
RANDY S. LUDLOW
311 S. State St.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
PAUL W. MORTENSEN
380 North 200 West, #260
Bountiful UT 84010
BY THE COURT,

Deputy Clerk

PAUL W. MORTENSEN, #23 31
Attorney for Petitioner
380 North 200 West, #260
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (801) 2 98-72 00
Fax: (801) 298-8950
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
CARRIE JOHNSON,

)
Petitioner,

vs.
JEFFREY DON JOHNSON,
Respondent.

)
)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)
)

Civil No. 964701989DA

)

JUDGE:

Michael G. Allphin

The above matter came on for trial on the 6th day of February,
1998, the Honorable Michael G. Allphin, District Judge, presiding.
Petitioner appeared in person and by and through Paul W. Mortensen,
her counsel of record. Respondent appeared in person and by and
through Randy S. Ludlow, his counsel of record.
The Court heard testimony and was presented evidence, and now
being fully advised in the premises and for good cause appearing,
makes and enters the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Both parties are residents of Davis County at least

three (3) months prior to the filing of the Complaint and service
of process was accomplished pursuant to the law.

The Court finds

that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of
the case.
2.
remained

The parties were married on June 22, 1984, and have

husband

and wife

to

the present.

The parties

have

experienced irreconcilable differences and the Court will award a
Decree of Divorce to become final upon entry.
3.
marriage:

The

following

are

minor

children

born

of

this

Heather Erinne, born November 2, 1988; Ansley Brooke,

born April 29, 1992; and Kevyn Kathleen born July 12, 1995.

The

parties have stipulated that Petitioner should exercise the primary
physical care of the minor children and the Court will enter an
order to that effect.

Respondent petitions the Court for joint

legal custody of the minor children.

The Court finds that it is

not in the best interest of these children to have joint legal
custody in the parties.

The parties have not demonstrated the

ability to get along one with another and to agree upon what is in
the best interest of the minor children.
30-3-33

Utah

Code

Annotated,

Respondent

However, pursuant to §
is

entitled

to

all

statutory rights and benefits as the non-custodial parent, which
shall include the following:
a.

Petitioner shall notify Respondent within 24

hours of receiving notice of all significant school, social, sports
and community functions in which the children are participating or
being honored, and Respondent

shall be entitled to attend and

participate fully;
b.

Respondent shall have access directly to all

school reports including preschool and day care reports and medical
records and shall be notified immediately by the custodial parent
in the event of a medical emergency;
c.

Each parent shall provide the other with their

current address and telephone number at this time and within 24
hours of any change;
d.

Each parent shall permit and encourage liberal

telephone contract during reasonable hours and uncensored mail
privileges with the children;
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e.

Parental care shall be presumed to be better

care for the children than surrogate care and the Court
encourage

the parties

to cooperate

shall

in allowing Respondent, if

willing and able, to provide child care;
f.

Each parent shall provide all surrogate care

providers with the name, current address, and telephone number of
the other parent

and shall provide each other with the name,

current

and

address,

telephone

number

of

all

surrogate

care

providers unless the Court for good cause orders otherwise;
4.

Respondent

is

entitled

to

reasonable

rights

of

visitation with the minor children and the Court will order that at
a minimum he should receive the standard rights of visitation as
set forth in the statute.

Even though the minor child Kevyn is not

quite three years old, the Court will order that Respondent have
the same visitation rights with her as he does the older children
and

that

is

the

standard

visitation

for

children

over

five.

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-35 visitation shall be as
follows:
(a)
noncustodial

One

weekday

evening

parent or the court

to

be

specified

from 5:30

by

p.m. until

the
8:30

p.m.;
(b)

Alternating

weekends beginning

on the

first

weekend after the entry of the decree from 6:00 p.m. on Friday
until 7:00 p.m. on Sunday continuing each year;
(c)
visitation,

and

Holidays

take

changes

shall

precedence
not

be

over

made

to

the

weekend

the

regular

rotation of the alternating weekend visitation schedule;
(d)

if a holiday falls on a regularly

scheduled

school day, the noncustodial parent shall be responsible for
the child's attendance at school for that school day;
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(e)

if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday

or Monday and the total holiday period extends beyond

that

time so that the child is free from school and the parent is
free from work, the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to
this lengthier holiday period;
(f)

in

years

ending

in

an

odd

number,

the

noncustodial parent is entitled to the following holidays:
(i)

child's birthday

on the

day before

or

after the actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9
p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he
may take other siblings along for the birthday;
(ii)

Human Rights Day beginning at 6 p.m. the

day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(iii) Easter holiday beginning 6 p.m. on Friday
until Sunday at 7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a
lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial

is

completely entitled;
(iv)

Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday

until Monday at 7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a
lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial

is

completely entitled;
(v)

July 24th beginning

6 p.m.

on the

day

before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday;
(vi) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6 p.m. the
day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school
vacation

as

defined

in

Subsection

30-3-32 (3) (b)

plus

Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1 p.m., so long as
the entire holiday is equally divided;
(g)

in

years

ending

in

an

even

number,

the

noncustodial parent is entitled to the following holidays:
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(i)

child's

birthday

on

actual

birthdate

beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m. at the discretion of the
noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along for
the birthday;
(ii) President's Day beginning at 6 p.m. the
day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(iii) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day
before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday;
(iv) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday
until Monday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a
lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent
is completely entitled;
(v) the

fall

school

break,

if

applicable,

commonly known as UEA weekend beginning at 6 p.m. on
Wednesday until

Sunday at

7 p.m. unless the

holiday

extends for a lengthier period of time to which the
noncustodial parent is completely entitled;
(vi) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day
before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(vii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday
at 7 p.m. until Sunday at 7 p.m.; and
(viii) the second portion of the

Christmas

school vacation as defined in Subsection 30-3-32 (3) (b)
plus Christmas day beginning at 1 p.m. until 9 p.m., so
long as the entire Christmas holiday is equally divided;
(h) Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or
adoptive father every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on
the holiday;
(i) Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or
adoptive mother every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on
the holiday;
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(j)

extended

visitation

with

the

noncustodial

parent may be:
(i) up to four weeks consecutive at the option
of the noncustodial parent;
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for
the noncustodial parent; and
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject
to visitation for the custodial parent consistent with
these guidelines;
(k)

the custodial parent shall have an identical

two-week period of uninterrupted time during the children's
summer vacation from school for purposes of vacation;
(1)

if the child is enrolled in year-round school,

the noncustodial parent's extended visitation shall be 1/2 of
the vacation time for year-round school breaks, provided the
custodial parent has holiday and phone visits;
(m) notification of extended visitation or vacation
weeks with the child shall be provided at least 3 0 days in
advance to the other parent; and
(n)

telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours

and for reasonable duration.
5.

The parties are ordered to be responsible for one-

half of the actually incurred day care expenses when the custodial
parent is working.
to day

care

Those expenses must be reasonable as compared

services generally.

The non-custodial

parent

is

entitled pursuant to the statute to provide day care if he is
available on a regular basis to do so.

If Petitioner pursues her

education to get a teaching certificate in an area other than
English or to obtain another degree requiring similar schooling,
Respondent is ordered to reimburse one-half of the day care which
is incurred as a result thereof.—
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6.

Petitioner has chosen to enroll the children in a

private school.

The Court finds that there will not be excess

resources on either side and that private school is a luxury and
not specifically required in this case, therefore, the Court will
not order the non-custodial parent to be responsible for one-half
of any private school tuition or books.

If Petitioner determines

to enroll the children in private school, she will do it with the
knowledge that she would be paying all of those costs.
7.

Respondent is ordered to provide health and accident

insurance for the benefit of the minor children.

The Court having

considered the financial circumstances and abilities of the parties
relating to the payment of the insurance premium will order that
Respondent be responsible for the payment of that premium and he
will not be entitled to any offset against child support for that
premium.

However, the parties will each be responsible for one-

half of the non-covered medical expenses of the minor children.
Pursuant to § 78-45-7.15 Utah Code Annotated, Petitioner should be
ordered to provide written notification of the cost and payment of
medical

expenses

to

Respondent

within

30

days

of

payment.

Respondent should be ordered to reimburse Petitioner for his onehalf of those expenses within 15 days after receiving notification.
8.

Respondent is directed to maintain a life insurance

policy of a minimum of $100,000.00, with the minor children named
as exclusive beneficiaries.

In the event of the Respondent's death

the insurance proceeds would be used for the support of the minor
children.

Respondent is ordered to provide proof of maintenance of

such insurance to Petitioner.
9.

The

Court

has

the

Respondent's income in this case.
that

during

$143,124.18.

1995

Respondent

obligation

to

determine

Evidence was presented to show

deposited

in

his

VAMCU

account

However, Respondent reported on his 1995 Schedule C
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that his gross receipts were $80,677.00.

For the calendar year

1996 Respondent deposited in his VAMCU account $137,606.98. (This
figure was derived by taking the total number of deposits and
subtracting $89,000.00 inheritance he received that year).
the

trial

Respondent

provided

the Court with Exhibit

During
3 which

contains a summary of his 1996 deposits which showed deposits of
$124,415.69.

In addition to that, the Court received as evidence

Respondent's 1996 income tax return and on his Schedule C for that
year he reports gross receipts of $97,549.00.

For calendar year

1997 Respondent reports in his Exhibit 3 that his total earning
deposits for 1997 was $105,314.21.

However, he has provided the

Court with the 1099 statements for that year and he shows a total
income of $94,471.35.

The Court notes there are discrepancies in

the years 1995, 1996, and 1997 as to what Respondent says his
income is and the tax returns which he filed and the bank deposits
for 1995 and 1996.

The Court finds that Respondent is not being

forthright and honest in his representation of what his income has
been for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997.

The Court is going to

calculate the Respondent's income by the following method.

The

Court will take the average of the 1995 deposit of $143,124.00 and
the

1996

deposits

of

$137,606.00

and

the

Respondent's

representation of his 1997 deposits of $105,314.00. The average of
those three years the Court calculates being $128,681.00.
Respondent
business.

is entitled

to

reasonable

expenses

to operate

Now,
his

The Court having examined the expenses of Respondent as

he has related them on his tax return and having considered his
testimony finds that he does not accurately represent his expenses
in the tax returns.
Respondent

The Court finds that reasonable expenses for

are $40,000.00 per year.

Taking the imputed gross

receipts of $128,681.00 less the $40,000.00 expenses, the Court
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finds that Respondent's income for purposes of calculating child
support and alimony is $88,681.00 or $7,390.00 per month.
10.

Petitioner is entitled to receive and Respondent is

ordered to pay child support pursuant to the guidelines using an
income

for Respondent

$1,000.00.

of

$7,3 90.00 and

imputing

to

Petitioner

The Court imputes income to Petitioner because she has

a Bachelor's Degree in English, and the Court finds she has the
ability to work and to earn income of at least $1,000.00 per month.
The Court finds that child support would be $1,482.00 per month.
Respondent is ordered to pay that amount beginning with the month
of February 1998.
11.

Petitioner has reasonable monthly expenses in the

amount of $4,000.00 per month.
ability

to make

The Court finds that she has the

$1,000.00 per month which would

calculate

to

approximately $750.00 in net income that she can generate on her
own.

That leaves expenses to be covered of $3,2 50.00.

She has a

child support award of $1,438.00 per month which would leave the
amount of $1,768.00 in expenses that would not be covered by her
income or child

support.

Petitioner has a need

for alimony.

Respondent has a gross monthly income for purposes of calculating
alimony of $7,390.00 per month.

After taxes, the Court finds that

he has a net income of approximately
expenses of $2,500.00 per month.
ability

to pay approximately

support and alimony.

$5,500.00 and

reasonable

This leaves Respondent with the

$3,000.00 per month toward

child

He is ordered to pay $1,482.00 per month in

child support, which leaves $1,518.00 which he has the ability to
pay to Petitioner in the form of alimony.

Based on the need of

Petitioner and the ability of Respondent to pay, the Court will
order that Respondent pay to Petitioner $1,518.00 per month in
alimony for a minimum of five years and a maximum of 13 years.

The

court approves the amount of child support ordered knowing that
9

such amount differs from the amount ($1,438.00) set forth on the
table.

The Court

finds

that

Petitioner has made

significant

sacrifice during the terms of the marriage as the Respondent has
pursued his graduate degree and subsequent training.

Respondent's

degree and his ability to now support himself as a doctor was due
to some extent to the efforts of both parties during the marriage.
Respondent will benefit hereafter until he retires and the Court
finds that it is appropriate that Petitioner benefit from her
efforts and sacrifices for a minimum period of five years.

The

Court will term this minimum period of alimony as reimbursement
alimony.

Alimony

shall

terminate

after

five

years

upon

the

remarriage or cohabitation of Petitioner.
12.

In addition, the Court finds that it is appropriate

in this case to likewise make a compensating adjustment in dividing
the marital property.

The parties have acquired a home in Layton,

Utah that has an appraised value of $118,300.00 and a mortgage
balance of $92,258.00.

The equity of the parties in that real

property is $27,042.00.

The Court finds it equitable to award

Petitioner the martial home, and the entire equity in the home.
The

Court

acknowledges

that

$6,000.00

came

from

Respondent's

grandfather and was used as the down payment for the purchase of
the marital residence. However, the Court considers this $6,000.00
to

have

been

a

gift

to

both

parties.

Petitioner

will

be

responsible for paying the mortgage payment and hold the Respondent
harmless in the event of her nonpayment.
13.

The parties have acquired certain personal property

during the term of the marriage.

The Court will award the property

that is currently in the possession of each party to that party
except as hereafter noted.

The Court finds that Petitioner has

certain items of personal property that are Respondent's and she
should

transfer

that

property

to
10

the

Respondent

as

soon

as

possible.

Those items are the trophy baseball, a box of antique

hammers and tools, a shovel with an "N" on it, and a tricycle and
wagon.

In addition, Petitioner is to give Respondent access to

family photos that may be copied.

The Court notes that Respondent

may have real property that was gifted to him by his family and
will

order

property

that

that

the

he

Petitioner

may

own

have

no

interest

separately.

The

in any

Court

real

awards

to

Petitioner her automobile and to Respondent his two automobiles.
14.

The

parties

have

acquired

certain

obligations during the term of their marriage.

debts

and

The Court will

order that each party pay the debts and obligations incurred by
them

since

the

time

of

separation.

Following

the

parties'

separation in October 1996, Respondent charged $3,502.00 and $41.39
to Petitioner's Citibank VISA for a ring given by Respondent to
Petitioner

and

for

clothes

purchased

by

Respondent's

use.

Respondent is responsible for payment of such debt and the interest
accrued thereon which was $971.12 as of date of trial. In addition,
the Court will order that Respondent be responsible for his student
loans and any tax debt that has been incurred.
15.

Each party will be responsible for the filing of

their own separate tax returns for the years 1996 and 1997.

The

Court will award tax exemptions for the youngest child and the
oldest child to Petitioner and will award the exemption for the
middle child to Respondent.
16.

The Court will issue a permanent mutual injunction

against either party interfering with credit or accounts of the
other party.
17.

The Court will issue a permanent mutual injunction

against either party from harming, harassing, going to the home or
work

place

of

the

other

except

visitation.
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for

purposes

of

exercising

18.

The Court finds that the Respondent is delinquent in

his alimony and child support obligation through the month of
January 1997 in the amount of $13,350.00.

The Court will enter a

judgment against Respondent on behalf of Petitioner in that amount.
Respondent in his testimony indicated that he did not have the
ability to pay each and every month and that is why the arrearage.
The Court finds that during the period that Respondent was ordered
to pay that he leased two automobiles of which he only needed one
and that he took vacations and trips which were not necessary.

The

Court will find that he had the ability to pay the amount that he
was ordered on an ongoing basis and that he willfully violated the
order of the Court and the Court will find him in contempt.

The

Court will order that he spend five days in the Davis County Jail
but will suspend the jail time on condition that he strictly follow
the orders of the Court in the future.

In addition, the Court will

award some attorney's fees that will be calculated later.
19.

Petitioner has an ongoing responsibility to provide

Respondent with visitation with the minor children.

The Court

finds that Petitioner has willfully violated the order of the Court
in this respect and that she denied visitation and the Court will
find her in contempt of Court and order that she spend five days in
the Davis County Jail.

The Court will suspend the jail time on

condition that she strictly follow the orders of the Court in the
future.
20.

The parties

each have had to

incur

substantial

attorney's fees in this matter to get the case to trial.
will

The Court

find that the Respondent has the ability to pay his own

attorney's fees.

The Court will find that Petitioner, with her

limited income and resources, does not have the ability to pay her
attorney's fees.

The Court will find that reasonable attorney's

fees to be incurred on behalf of the Petitioner in this particular
12

case is $20,000.00. The Court finds that while Petitioner does not
have the ability to generate income to pay these fees and will
enter a judgment against Respondent on behalf of Petitioner in the
amount of $20,000.00 for attorney's fees.
21.

It is the understanding of the Court that neither

party has any retirement benefits and thus there would be nothing
to share pursuant to Woodward.
22.

Each of the parties is ordered to cooperate in the

execution of any documents necessary to finalize this order, or for
property distribution, custody, visitation, and child support under
the terms of the divorce decree.
23.

Plaintiff's Exhibit 47 set forth $847.81 in child

medical expenses as of date of trial.

On June 29, 1998, Respondent

paid to Petitioner the amount of $423.90 which represents full
payment of Respondent's one-half of the medical expenses owed as of
trial.
From the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, the Court makes and
enters the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
A.

DIVORCE GRANTED:

Petitioner should be awarded a

Decree of Divorce from Respondent, thereby dissolving the bonds of
matrimony presently existing between the parties.

Such Decree

should become final on entry upon the records of the Court.
B.

CUSTODY,

SUPPORT, ALIMONY

AND

VISITATION:

The

custody of and visitation with the parties' minor children, the
child support, and the alimony should be ordered in accordance with
the Findings herein.
C.

DEBTS AND PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION:

In making

the

alimony and child support findings above, the Court has taken into
account the allocation of debts, the distribution of property, and
13

the insurance provisions contained herein; each such item should be
ordered in accordance with those Findings.
D.

MISCELLANEOUS:

insurance, health

The costs and attorney's fees, life

insurance and other miscellaneous

provisions

should be ordered in accordance with the Findings herein.
DATED this

JS **"day of July, 1998.

MICHAEL O/ALLPI
District ^Judge
RULE 4-504 CERTIFICATE
The undersigned hereby certifies that he mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to the following individual,
at the address shown hereunder via first-class mail, postage
prepaid on this
% ^ ^
day of July, 1998.
The undersigned
further requests that the Order be signed and entered as submitted
pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration at
the expiration of the appropriate time.
Randy S. Ludlow
Attorney at Law
336 South 300 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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PAUL W. MORTENSEN, #2331
Attorney for Petitioner
380 North 200 West, #260
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (801) 298-7200
Fax: (801) 298-8950
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR DAVIS COUNTY
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
CARRIE JOHNSON,
Petitioner,

DECREE OF DIVORCE

vs.
Civil No. 964701989DA
JEFFREY DON JOHNSON,
Respondent.

JUDGE:

Michael G. Allphin

The above matter came on for trial on the 6th day of February,
1998, the Honorable Michael G. Allphin, District Judge, presiding.
Petitioner appeared in person and by and through Paul W. Mortensen,
her counsel of record. Respondent appeared in person and by and
through Randy S. Ludlow, his counsel of record.
The Court heard testimony and was presented evidence, and
being fully advised in the premises and having heretofore entered
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now therefore, makes
and enters the following:
DECREE OF DIVORCE
1.
DIVORCE GRANTED: Petitioner is hereby granted a
Decree of Divorce from Respondent, thereby severing the bonds of
matrimony heretofore existing between the parties. Said Decree to
become final upon entry in the official records of the clerk of
Davis County, State of Utah, automatically and without further
action by the parties.
JUDGMENT ENTERED

BY

\\^

2.

CUSTODY:

Petitioner

is

awarded

the

sole

care,

custody and control of the following minor children born of this
marriage:
born

Heather Erinne, born November 2, 1988; Ansley Brooke,

April

29,

1992;

and

Kevyn

Kathleen

born

July

12,

1995.

However, pursuant to § 30-3-33 Utah Code Annotated, Respondent is
entitled to all statutory rights and benefits as the non-custodial
parent, which shall include the following:
(a)

Petitioner shall notify Respondent within 24

hours of receiving notice of all significant school, social,
sports

and

community

participating

or

functions

being

in

honored,

which

and

the

children

Respondent

are

shall

be

entitled to attend and participate fully;
(b)

Respondent

shall have access directly to all

school reports including preschool and day care reports and
medical

records

and

shall

be

notified

immediately

by

the

custodial parent in the event of a medical emergency;
(c)

Each parent shall provide the other with their

current address and telephone number at this time and within
24 hours of any change;
(d)

Each parent shall permit and encourage liberal

telephone contract during reasonable hours and uncensored mail
privileges with the children;
(e)

Parental care shall be presumed to be better

care for the children than surrogate care and the Court shall
encourage the parties to cooperate in allowing Respondent, if
willing and able, to provide child care;
(f)

Each parent shall provide all surrogate

care

providers with the name, current address, and telephone number
of

the other parent

and

shall provide

each other with

the

name, current address, and telephone number of all surrogate
care

providers

unless

the

otherwise.

2

Court

for

good

cause

orders

3.

VISITATION:

Respondent is entitled to reasonable

rights of visitation with the minor children and the Court orders
that

at

a

minimum

he

should

receive

the

visitation as set forth in the statute.

standard

rights

of

Even though the minor

child Kevyn is not quite three years old, the Court will order that
Respondent have the same visitation rights with her as he does the
older children and that is the standard visitation for children
over five.

Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-35 visitation

shall be as follows:
(a)

One weekday

evening

to be specified

by the

noncustodial parent or the court from 5:30 p.m. until

8:30

p.m. ;
(b)

Alternating weekends beginning

on the first

weekend after the entry of the decree from 6:00 p.m. on Friday
until 7:00 p.m. on Sunday continuing each year;
(c)
visitation,

Holidays

and changes

take
shall

precedence

over

not be made

the

weekend

to the

regular

rotation of the alternating weekend visitation schedule;
(d)

if a holiday falls on a regularly

scheduled

school day, the noncustodial parent shall be responsible for
the child's attendance at school for that school day;
(e)

if a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday

or Monday and the total holiday period extends beyond

that

time so that the child is free from school and the parent is
free from work, the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to
this lengthier holiday period;
(f)

in

years

ending

in

an

odd

number,

the

noncustodial parent is entitled to the following holidays:
(i)

child's

birthday

on the day before

or

after the actual birthdate beginning at 3 p.m. until 9
p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he
may take other siblings along for the birthday;
3

(ii)

Human Rights Day beginning at 6 p.m. the

day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(iii) Easter holiday beginning 6 p.m. on Friday
until Sunday at 7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a
lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial is
completely entitled;
(iv)

Memorial Day beginning 6 p.m. on Friday

until Monday at 7 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a
lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial is
completely entitled;
(v)

July 24th beginning 6 p.m. on the day

before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday;
(vi) Veteran's Day holiday beginning 6p.m. the
day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(vii) the first portion of the Christmas school
vacation as defined

in Subsection 30-3-32 (3) (b) plus

Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1 p.m., so long as
the entire holiday is equally divided;
(g)

in

years

ending

in

an

even

number,

the

noncustodial parent is entitled to the following holidays:
(i)

child's

birthday

on

actual

birthdate

beginning at 3 p.m. until 9 p.m. at the discretion of the
noncustodial parent, he may take other siblings along for
the birthday;
(ii) President's Day beginning at 6 p.m. the
day before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(iii) July 4th beginning at 6 p.m. the day
before the holiday until 11 p.m. on the holiday;
(iv) Labor Day beginning at 6 p.m. on Friday
until Monday at 7 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a
lengthier period of time to which the noncustodial parent
is completely entitled;
4

(v)

the

fall

school

break,

if

applicable,

commonly known as UEA weekend beginning at 6 p.m. on
Wednesday until
extends

Sunday at 7 p.m. unless

the holiday

for a lengthier period of time to which the

noncustodial parent is completely entitled;
(vi) Columbus Day beginning at 6 p.m. the day
before the holiday until 7 p.m. on the holiday;
(vii) Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday
at 7 p.m. until Sunday at 7 p.m.; and
(viii) the second portion of the

Christmas

school vacation as defined in Subsection 30-3-32 (3) (b)
plus Christmas day beginning at 1 p.m. until 9 p.m., so
long as the entire Christmas holiday is equally divided;
(h) Father's Day shall be spent with the natural or
adoptive father every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on
the holiday;
(i) Mother's Day shall be spent with the natural or
adoptive mother every year beginning at 9 a.m. until 7 p.m. on
the holiday;
(j)

extended

visitation

with

the

noncustodial

parent may be:
(i) up to four weeks consecutive at the option
of the noncustodial parent;
(ii) two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for
the noncustodial parent; and
(iii) the remaining two weeks shall be subject
to visitation for the custodial parent consistent with
these guidelines;
(k)

the custodial parent shall have an identical

two-week period of uninterrupted time during the children's
summer vacation from school for purposes of vacation;

5

(1)

if the child is enrolled in year-round school,

the noncustodial parent's extended visitation shall be 1/2 of
the vacation time for year-round school breaks, provided the
custodial parent has holiday and phone visits;
(m) notification of extended visitation or vacation
weeks with the child shall be provided at least 3 0 days in
advance to the other parent; and
(n)

telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours

and for reasonable duration.
4.

DAY CARE EXPENSES:

The parties are ordered to be

responsible for one-half of the actually incurred day care expenses
when the custodial parent

is working.

Those expenses must be

reasonable as compared to day care services generally.

The non-

custodial parent is entitled pursuant to the statute to provide day
care if he is available on a regular basis to do so.

If Petitioner

pursues her education to get a teaching certificate in an area
other than English or to obtain another degree requiring similar
schooling, Respondent is ordered to reimburse one-half of the, day
care which is incurred as a result thereof. /%C^¥^v ty*** ^ — ^ ,
5.

^x, - ^

PRIVATE SCHOOL: Petitioner shalSTbe responsible f o r ^ & > > ^ ^

all costs associated with the children's enrollment in private z*+*£/**t^
school, if she chooses to enroll the children in a private school.
6.

HEALTH

AND

ACCIDENT

INSURANCE:

Respondent

is

ordered to provide health and accident insurance for the benefit of
the minor children.

The Court having considered the financial

circumstances and abilities of the parties relating to the payment
of

the

insurance

premium

orders

that

Respondent

shall

be

responsible for the payment of that premium and he will not be
entitled to any offset against child support for that premium.
However, the parties will each be responsible for one-half of the
non-covered medical expenses of the minor children.
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Pursuant to

§ 78-45-7.15 Utah Code Annotated, Petitioner should be ordered to
provide written notification of the cost and payment of medical
expenses to Respondent within 3 0 days of payment.

Respondent

should be ordered to reimburse Petitioner for his one-half of those
expenses within 15 days after receiving notification.
7.

LIFE INSURANCE:

Respondent is directed to maintain

a life insurance policy of a minimum of $100,000.00, with the minor
children named as exclusive beneficiaries.

In the event of the

Respondent's death the insurance proceeds would be used for the
support of the minor children.

Respondent is ordered to provide

proof of maintenance of such insurance to Petitioner.
8.

CHILD SUPPORT:

On the basis of Respondent's income

of approximately $7,390.00 per month, Petitioner's imputed earnings
of approximately $1,000.00 per month, and further as consideration
for the other aspects of the property settlement, debt allocation
and insurance provisions contained herein, Respondent should be
ordered to pay to Petitioner as and for child support during the
minority of the parties' children and through their graduation from
high school, whichever is later, the sum of $1,482.00 per month
commencing on the Fifth day of February, 1998, and payable in equal
installments
thereafter.

on

the

Fifth

and

Twentieth

days

of

each

month

The Court approves the amount of child support ordered

knowing that such amount differs from the amount ($1,438.00) set
forth on the table.
9.

ALIMONY:

Based upon the need of Petitioner and the

ability of Respondent to pay, Respondent

is ordered to pay to

Petitioner $1,518.00 per month in alimony for a minimum of five
years and a maximum of 13 years.
period

of

alimony

as

The Court will term this minimum

reimbursement

alimony.

Alimony

shall

terminate after five years upon the remarriage or cohabitation of
Petitioner.

Said alimony payment shall commence on the Fifth day
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of February, 1998, and payable in equal installments on the Fifth
and Twentieth days of each month thereafter.
10.

REAL

PROPERTY:

In consideration

for the

child

support, alimony, debt allocation, and other provisions in this
action, the real property of the marriage is awarded and allocated
as follows:
A.

PETITIONER

is

awarded

all

right

title

and

interest in the marital residence located at 946 North 1500 East,
Layton, Utah 84041 and more particularly described as:
All of Lot 17, Roueche Hills Subdivision, No.
2, A subdivision of part of Section 22,
Township 4 North, Range 1 West, Salt Lake
Meridian in the city of Layton, Davis County,
Utah.
Such

award

should

be

made

subject

to

the

debt

thereon,

and

Petitioner is ordered to hold harmless and defend Respondent from
any non-payment.
B.

Respondent is awarded no equity in the marital

residence.
11.

PERSONAL

PROPERTY:

The

parties

have

acquired

certain personal property during the term of the marriage.

The

Court will award the property that is currently in the possession
of each party to that party except as hereafter noted.

The Court

finds that Petitioner has certain items of personal property that
are Respondent's and she should transfer that property to the
Respondent

as

soon as possible.

Those

items

are

the

trophy

baseball, a box of antique hammers and tools, a shovel with an "N"
on it, and a tricycle and wagon.

In addition, Petitioner is to

give Respondent access to family photos that may be copied.

The

Court notes that Respondent may have real property that was gifted
to him by his family and will order that the Petitioner have no
interest in any real property that he may own separately.
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The

Court awards to Petitioner her automobile and to Respondent his two
automobiles.
12.

DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS:

The parties have acquired

certain debts and obligations during the term of their marriage.
Each party is ordered to pay the debts and obligations incurred by
them

since

the

time

of

separation.

separation in October 1996,

Following

the

parties'

Respondent charged $3,502.00 and $41.39

to Petitioner's Citibank VISA for a ring given by Respondent to
Petitioner

and

for

clothes

purchased

by

Respondent's

use.

Respondent is responsible for payment of such debt and the interest
accrued

thereon

which

was

$971.12

as

of

date

of

trial.

In

addition, the Court orders that Respondent be responsible for his
student loans and any tax debt that has been incurred.
13.

TAX RETURNS FOR 1996 AND 1997:

Each party will be

responsible for the filing of their own separate tax returns for
the years 1996 and 1997.
14.
exemptions

for

TAX

EXEMPTIONS:

the

youngest

Petitioner
child

and

is awarded

the

oldest

the

tax

child

and

Respondent is awarded the tax exemption for the middle child.
15.

PERMANENT

INJUNCTIONS:

The

Court

will

issue

a

permanent mutual injunction against either party interfering with
credit or accounts of the other party.
issue a permanent

mutual

Furthermore, the Court will

injunction against

either party

from

harming, harassing, going to the home or work place of the other
except for purposes of exercising visitation.
16.

CONTEMPT/JUDGMENT

FOR

DELINQUENT

SUPPORT:

Petitioner is awarded judgment against Respondent in the amount of
$13,350.00 as and for past due alimony and child support through
the month of January 1998.

The Court having found that Respondent

had the ability to pay the amount that he was ordered on an ongoing
basis and that he willfully violated the order of the Court hereby
finds him in contempt.

The Court will order that he spend five
9

days in the Davis County Jail but will suspend the jail time on
condition that he strictly follow the orders of the Court in the
future.

In addition, the Court will award some attorney's fees

that will be calculated later.
17.

CONTEMPT RE VISITATION:

Petitioner has an ongoing

responsibility to provide Respondent with visitation with the minor
children.

The Court having found that Petitioner has willfully

violated the order of the Court in this respect and that she denied
visitation hereby finds her in contempt of Court and orders that
she spend five days in the Davis County Jail.

The Court will

suspend the jail time on condition that she strictly follow the
orders of the Court in the future.
18.

ATTORNEY'S FEES:

Petitioner is awarded judgment

against Respondent in the amount of $20,000.00 for attorney's fees.
19.
the Court

RETIREMENT:

As a result of the representations to

that neither party

has any retirement

benefits, no

allocation of said retirement is necessary.
20.

PAST DUE MEDICAL EXPENSES:

Plaintiff's Exhibit 47

set forth $847.81 in child medical expenses as of date of trial.
On June 29, 1998, Respondent paid to Petitioner the amount of
$423.90 which represents full payment of Respondent's one-half of
the medical expenses owed as of trial.
21.
to

cooperate

finalize

SIGNING OF PAPERS:
in

this

visitation,

the

order,

and child

decree.
DATED this

execution
or

for

support

Each of the parties is ordered
of

any

property

day of July, 1998.
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necessary

distribution,

under the terms of

y;
/o

documents

the

to
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divorce

RULE 4-504 CERTIFICATE
The undersigned hereby certifies that he mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document to the following individual,
at the address shown hereunder via first-class mail, postage
prepaid on this
^ <*W day of July, 1998.
The undersigned
further requests that the Order be signed and entered as submitted
pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration at
the expiration of the appropriate time.
Randy S. Ludlow
Attorney at Law
336 South 300 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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